[Note from Mike Dorf: The following post by Sherry Colb went up virtually simultaneously with Neil Buchanan's post yesterday morning due to a scheduling mix-up on my part. In case it was missed, I'm moving it up the page for a bit. Please note also that this means that the reference in Paul Scott's post to Sherry's post "below" now refers to this post, which is above. So many bloggers; so little room . . . .]
In recent posts, there has been much discussion about whether it might be morally acceptable to consume animal products if their production involved death but not suffering. The realities of agriculture, of course, have nothing to do with painless or cruelty-free death, whether one is consuming "cage free" or "organic" animal products or factory-farmed versions of such products. (For a useful antidote to "cage-free" and other such claims about humanely raised animals, read this). But some argue that due to (hypothesized) limitations in animals' ability to conceive of themselves in the future, inflicting a painless death could somehow represent a morally neutral act. Here is a thought for believers that farmed animals' (hypothetical) painless death would represent no harm. It is important to say, if only because those who consume animal products may think that the possibility of painless death represents an argument for human omnivorousness, even if that possibility is not realized in fact.
Nonhuman animals -- including those routinely "raised" and slaughtered -- require proximity to other nonhuman animals for their wellbeing (not unlike human animals, incidentally, whose insanity in response to solitary confinement is well known). Therefore, when an animal is slaughtered, then even if death were not itself a harm to the slaughtered animal, either it will cause great distress to other nonhuman animals (the ones who have become attached to the one who is slaughtered) or, if there are no nearby nonhuman animals -- if the one animal is completely isolated -- then the life of isolation in which the "farmer" has kept this animal will have been one of extreme cruelty.
Thus, in order to slaughter an animal for food, one must either deprive the animal of bonding and relationship with other animals (and thereby "harm" the animal by causing him or her to suffer terribly) or must, in taking the animal away to slaughter, cause the animals with whom the one has bonded to suffer terribly in the face of the loss.
Indeed, cows bellow loudly when their cage-mates are trucked away for slaughter. They do the same when their babies are taken away for veal (to allow the milk to be diverted to human rather than calf consumption) -- they mourn and bellow, and other cows try to comfort them. And this is no less true for birds such as chickens. Hens are very attached to their chicks, enjoy snuggling with them, and do not want them taken and killed. Interestingly, our language recognizes this reality (even as so many of us have forgotten it) by referring to "mother hens."
It is thus impossible to raise animals for food and food products and avoid causing them intense suffering, and it is impossible to kill an animal without causing other animals intense suffering. It would seem to follow from this that one ought to aspire to be a vegan (and in fact be a vegan) and thus withdraw support from the inherently cruel institution of animal agriculture. To do otherwise is to communicate a vote -- far more effectively than by voting on election day -- for the cruelty to continue. There is no painless slaughter, and one cannot disclaim responsibility for demanding that suffering simply by assuming that there is.
Posted by Sherry Colb
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22 comments:
I realize this is a slight departure from the topic of your blog post, but I had a couple questions relating to the veganism discussion that has been going on, and thought this might be the right time to post them.
1. Is there a philosophical response to the "nature, red in tooth and claw" argument? It seems to me that farming/meat-eating apologists could respond to vegan critiques by saying that suffering is either (a) no greater than what the animals would experience in nature or (b) if greater, no different in kind.
2. In other (tax-related) posts on the blog, posters have discussed the debt owed to us by future generations. Since, in some senses, we are responsible for the existence of farm animals, is there any argument from that fact that would support some limited form of suffering (i.e., the animals might suffer briefly, but they get to enjoy other things because they are farm animals raised for slaughter).
3. Finally, it appears to me that some of the disagreement over the last couple days/weeks has been about the quality of suffering undergone by animals (and not necessarily the fact that they suffer). Using the analogy to babies that someone made earlier, it seems to me that the outward display of emotion/distress made by babies (and/or young children) is not necessarily in line with an objective view of the suffering about which they are complaining. Babies and children can complain very loudly about very minor things while sometimes suffering stoicly through major traumas. What leads you to believe that the signs of distress shown by animals are aligned with their suffering?
Thanks much for this salutary (well, actually, urgent) reminder, Sherry. I felt some nagging misgivings about "bracketing" the matter of "third party effects" in my own ruminations (yes, I, like a cow, am a sort of ruminant), even given the helpfulness of this practice for purposes of isolating and beaming in on (a conceptually, though not practically) isolable question. For of course most of the creatures we "raise" to kill and eat will be suffering in an important sense if we do attempt to keep them isolated (that's not in their natures), while on the other hand those that live with them will suffer their loss if we don't isolate them. (Presumably the agribusinesses do not kill entire families at once, since that wouldn't be profitable.) So we're damned if we do ("raise" them together), damned if we don't -- unless, of course, what we don't do is what it seems we shouldn't do, which is to "raise" them to kill them and eat them at all. Thanks again and more soon, Bob
Caleb raises some very important questions that I can only begin to answer here but about which I do want to say a few things.
First, yes, there is an answer to the "nature, red in tooth and claw" argument. It is that much of nature is not what we see depicted on the Discovery channel. Because violence is so costly, much of the animal kingdom has ways of avoiding violence (e.g., by threatening displays and submission behaviors). Even inter-species, there is far less violence than one imagines. Most of a herd of deer will not be slaughtered by a carnivore, and they will enjoy their lives and engage in playful and altruistic behavior in the company of their loved ones. Every animal on a farm, by contrast, will be killed long before her natural time. I want to repeat an earlier reference to a book called "Pleasurable Kingdom," in which the sheer joy of which animals are capable is explored. As a much-under-studied phenomenon, animal joy helps fill out the picture of why animals in the wild are not in a constant state of suffering (and why they are in fact better off there than on our farms).
Second, as I describe in greater detail in my discussion of reproductive rights and future generations (which will appear in the upcoming G.W.symposium publication), we do not "owe" anyone thanks (or any debt) for our existence itself, just as we -- prior to existing (whether one identifies that as a moment prior to conception or at some point during fetal development or at birth) -- did not have a right to come into existence. Therefore, I don't think that the fact that we created particular animals in order to farm them translates into "they now owe us their meat, because if not for the hope of meat, they would never have existed." It seems more appropriate to say that because we made them exist, we owe it to them to care for them and not harm them (just as we do to the children we create).
By taking the farmer's position, one could justify human slavery, by saying that particular people would not have existed but for the institution of slavery and that these people accordingly owe thanks to the institution for their existence and can be made to suffer as a payment for that existence. To give a more frivolous example, I may create a child because I want someone to help me in my medical practice, but that does not obligate my child to become a doctor.
Third, I agree with you that babies sometimes kick up a fuss over what we might view as trivial. My suggestion on this point, however, would be that babies are often truly terrified and distressed by things that would not terrify or distress an adult or even a child (e.g. being separated from his mother), because babies lack the ability to know that suffering or separation is momentary. The reason I believe that animal signs of distress are in fact indicators of their suffering is that they react to such things as unanaesthetized castration and "branding" (routine parts of farming) in exactly the way that a human being reacts to torture -- with loud cries and attempts to extricate themselves, followed by anxiety and fear in the future. Baby goats respond to seeing a knife heading for their throats by crying, and they respond to being stabbed with screams. Because they are so much like us in their neural pathways and brain chemistry, I infer that when they are subjected to human acts that would cause excruciating pain in humans and then react in the same sorts of ways in which humans react to torture, that they are experiencing the same sort of thing that human beings are.
This is a really interesting argument, and one I haven't heard before. I'd be curious to hear what you think about the following:
I've always thought the arguments for not eating meat in the real world probably come apart from the arguments for not eating meat in the idealized "cruelty free" world you argue cannot exist. My thought was not that eating meat would be OK in the idealized world, but that the argument against it would be different in kind: i.e. possibly not utilitarian. I have some ideas about what it would look like but I'm nowhere near as certain about them as I am in the argument that eating meat in today's world is wrong.
In any case, people sometimes ask me if, theoretically, I would eat meat if animals were raised and slaughtered in some cruelty free way and I've found it very useful to say "yes" for rhetorical purposes. (I usually then qualify the statement by saying that if I didn't eat meat in that world it would be for different reasons and that I'm not as confident about those reasons as I am about the reasons for not eating meat in the real world).
The idea is that I think any rational person when truly forced to confront the horribleness of factory farming that we've been conditioned to ignore and accept would see that it was wrong to eat meat. The point doesn't require extensive, fine tuned argumentation because it is just so obvious to anyone who learns about it and thinks carefully about it (assuming people adhere to the basic moral principles I think most of us accept). Your argument might be right, but it's much easier for meat eaters to accept the cruelty of foie gras or veal, for example, than it is for them to accept that it is cruel to eat farm animals full stop.
I've found it's not terribly difficult to convince people that the particular way we go about our animal agricultural practices has gotten wildly out of whack.
The way I envision the future unfolding, if I'm being optimistic, is that people will come to realize the pretty obvious fact that the way we do things now is terribly wrong and this will force a scaling back. (I think this is already happening to some extent). This will, in turn, introduce at least some increased sensitivity to the treatment of animals when it comes to farming and, as a result, the threshold for what counts as cruelty to animals will become lower, thus forcing another scaling back of the industry until, eventually, we reach the "cruelty free" world you're discussing. At that point, I think your argument (as well as other non-utilitarian ones) will become compelling to most people.
So, my very long winded question is this: do you think there is any sense in which uncompromising arguments for animal rights undercut their effectiveness to the public? The flip-side, of course, is that the more gradualist rhetorical strategy is not as intellectually honest. But in this arena, shouldn't intellectual honesty take second place to whatever will be most effective in reducing animal suffering? I guess the basic question is, how should academics balance philosophy with politics?
I think similar questions arose in the context of civil and women's rights. The analogy would be that lots of people in the 19th century, for example, could easily be convinced that slavery was wrong. Few of those people, however, would be easily convinced that there should be equal rights for all races. Wouldn't arguing for full civil rights, at that time, undermine what otherwise might be very effective arguments against slavery? And, if so, what is the responsibility of the arguer who knows that her arguments for civil rights (and not just slavery) are correct?
Derek asks some very good questions. If I believed that conceding (arguendo) that killing animals in a suffering-free way is "okay" would quicken our movement forward, I think I would be more open to considering the concession. I am happy to concede, of course, that killing animals (and humans, for that matter) in a pain-free way is less horrific than what in fact takes place in the real world.
I worry, however, that the way in which human psychology works is to identify a theoretical case in which it might be acceptable (or less morally outrageous) to produce and consume animal products and then, even though that theoretical universe does not exist anywhere, to then continue doing exactly what they were doing before (e.g., the very people who raise the hypothetical case of cruelty free death do *not* refrain from eating animal products in the real world; they simply invoke this hypothetical case as a justification for their behavior, because the theoretical possibility of cruelty-free death somehow translates their consumption behavior into a vote for death without the "reality baggage" that comes with it -- "I'm against cruelty, while I eat this cheeseburger, but my consumption of the cheeseburger just means I want killing, but minus the suffering").
This is why, from my perspective, it is so significant to point out that one cannot slaughter animals for food without causing great suffering, even from an analytic perspective, as I suggested in my post.
On the question of "one step at a time," I have a column in which I discuss this argument (http://writ.news.findlaw.com/colb/20090304.html), and I suggest that at some point, the "steps" people take are meaningless (e.g., refraining from foie gras and veal while consuming geese and dairy doesn't change anything and does not communicate much of a message, because the geese are still tortured and killed painfully, though in a different way, and the calves are still produced (through a "rape rack" annual insemination of cows) and then taken away from their moms, with great loss and misery on both ends -- to enable milk production for humans -- and then killed, along with their mother, when the milk production drops off).
I guess the slavery analogy, to me, would not be "okay, let's say we're not equal, but slavery is still wrong" (which was how real abolitionists did think, by and large), but instead, "okay, let's say slavery is okay, but beatings should be limited to fifteen minutes per slave, unless the slave is not very bright, and the slave should be permitted to take a drink of water just before the beating." This "step" strikes me as unlikely to go anywhere (and, in any event, is not likely to be enforced in a system of human slavery, as various regulations on slave mistreatment were, in fact, unenforced and as various current regulations against specific mistreatments of farm animals -- e.g. that they be unconscious when their throats are cut -- are not enforced now).
Thanks, Sherry, for your very thoughtful response. Part of this is just an empirical question about human behavior/psychology. But I also think I need to re-think some of these issues; I'll read your column.
Caleb has raised in his #3 a crucial question about your anthropomorphic interpretation of the behavioral evidence. Let us suppose your interpretation is correct. I would like to pose a different question: do you think it immoral to use animals in medical experimentation that leads to life-saving and/or non-cosmetic therapies that reduce human suffering? Do you, in other words, believe not just that non-human animals deserve moral consideration, but that they have equal moral standing to humans, such that medical experimentation of the kind described would not be justified (as we would, presumably, deem it unjustified in the case of experimentation on humans)?
Brian raises an interesting point that indirectly (and certainly unintentionally) strengthens the case for veganism with respect to food, clothing, and much experimentation. But first an observation about “anthropomorphism.” There are undoubtedly some human behaviors, perceptions, and capacities that are not shared by other non-human animals, or when shared, not shared in the same degree or in the same way. A taste for reality tv might be one; enjoying the works of Nietzsche might be another; the ability to play chess at the grand master level is likely a third. However, it would be utterly remarkable---the first actual evidence for separate creation or intelligent design, rather than evolution from common ancestors---if all of the common behaviors and neurophysiology we observe among humans and non-human animals did not bespeak similar subjective experiences. That is why many ethologists who actually study non-human animals refer not to anthropomorphism but to the exact opposite, what Frans de Waal has called “anthropodenial,” the rejection of obviously shared characteristics between humans and non-human animals by those invested in drawing the distinction.
Now onto the question of whether non-human animals merely deserve some moral consideration versus whether they have equal moral standing with humans. I’ll begin by noting just how much the question gives away to the vegan case against inflicting suffering on non-humans for food and clothing---which are not in any way necessary to a richly satisfying human life, and in fact have very harmful consequences for individual human health and humans more broadly, insofar as animal agriculture despoils the planet (because, among other things, so much of the caloric content of plants is lost in converting them to animal foods). Unless one is prepared to say that non-human animals have no moral standing whatsoever---that we may subject them to any torment for even the slightest momentary satisfaction of a human taste---the case for veganism with respect to food and clothing is very strong. This is the first point Bob Hockett was making in his post, and a point I was making in my various posts and replies to comments.
What about scientific research? Here I’ll note first that human health might well benefit much more from switching to a plant-based diet than by most scientific research. But let us suppose that there is some disease that afflicts vegans as well as non-vegans and there is some proposed experiment on non-human animals that, according to the best judgment of knowledgeable people, would probably result in a cure for the disease. Let us also suppose that even after reducing the harm the experiment will cause to the animal subjects as much as we can, there is some inevitable amount of suffering it will cause these subjects. Do we have a right to conduct that experiment?
This is a question about which people who are committed to veganism with respect to food, clothing, and much quite unnecessary animal experimentation, will differ, depending on their grounds for veganism: (1) For those of us for whom veganism is simply about not inflicting gratuitous suffering on feeling beings, inflicting such suffering may be considered acceptable where there really is a prospect of substantial benefit. (2) For those of us for whom non-human animals are owed something more---a duty of non-harm---then what we deem necessary for human health does not justify the cost. I would note, though, that even the vegans in the second camp are not necessarily equating non-humans’ moral worth with the moral worth of humans. One could still think, for example, that the duty we owe to non-humans is simply a duty of non-harm, whereas we owe more affirmative duties---such as redistribution of some of our resources---to humans.
In any event, Sherry’s position (or mine or that of other vegans) on the choice between (1) and (2) has no bearing on the validity of the argument against inflicting suffering on non-human animals for non-necessities.
I wonder if Brian's objection is not misplaced for two reasons.
First, the accusation of anthropomorphism seems a bit too easy in that it is almost always leveled against any argument wherein comparisons of similarity are made between humans animals and non-human animals. (Indeed, those familiar with the history of thought will be fully aware of the declining horizons of difference between humans and non-human animals any attack upon which has frequently been defended through the accusation of anthropomorphism.) For the accusation of anthropomorphism to work, it is necessary that the objector demonstrate that it is, in fact, a possibility or, better, that it is even relevant. For instance, if mammalian brains and nervous systems are, indeed, organized and constructed in more or less the same way as species (they are), it seems to be a reasonable inference that they operate in the same way (they do). Put in other words, given what we know about nerves and pain in humans, it seems to be a reasonable inference that non-human animals with comparable nervous systems experience pain in more or less the same way as humans. It is up to those who deny that pain works in the same way for humans and non-humans animals to argue why A delta and C fibers work one way in one case but differently in another case. That is, why should we accept human exceptionalism as a default position? In this light, anthropomorphism isn't legitimate accusation, but an attempt to have cake and eat it too.
Secondly, humans and non-human animals are clearly in a different position relative to medical experimentation: humans can rationally consent to being used as research subjects (if they could not, psychology and clinical trials, among other practices, would be impossible); non-human animals are in no such position. Indeed, given the apparatuses that experimenters must use to get animals to "consent" to experimentation (ranging from various restraining devices to sedatives and anesthetics), it appears to be the case that only possible interpretation of the animal's resistance to procedures is that they are visibly and vigorously denying consent!
If I may, there is one book in particular that treats the question of animal experimentation with considerable philosophical acumen: Hugh LaFollette and Niall Shanks, Brute Science: Dilemmas of Animal Experimentation (New York: Routledge, 1996).
Mike has more than adequately addressed the animal experimentation "argument" (to the extent it can even be called an argument) against veganism as it relates to food/clothing/vanity. I agree with his post in its entirety. I comment to add only one small observation.
I always find it amusing that people think non-human animal make such good models for Human health that are both necessary and excellent subjects of medical/biological experimentation - serving as a proxy for Humans in those experiments. This, correct (when leaving aside the issue of ethics) assertion by those like Leiter is because of the large degree of shared physiology and biology and chemistry between human and non-human animals.
These same people never see the disconnect between that assertion and their absurd assertion that the non-human animal's shared biology, chemistry and physiology when it comes to the brain results in such disparate function that it is declared as impossible that these non-human animals experience anything like as human animals.
It is a disconnect that seems so obvious that one has to wonder what motivation there is to assert it.
Thanks to Mike Dorf for actually responding to the question I posed, which I posed out of curiosity to understand the contours of the moral position of vegans.
On the anthropomorphism issue, I mainly meant to agree that Caleb's question is a pertinent one. It does seem to me that claims like the following (from Sherry's original post)--"cows bellow loudly when their cage-mates are trucked away for slaughter. They do the same when their babies are taken away for veal (to allow the milk to be diverted to human rather than calf consumption) -- they mourn and bellow, and other cows try to comfort them. And this is no less true for birds such as chickens. Hens are very attached to their chicks, enjoy snuggling with them, and do not want them taken and killed"--clearly involve ascriptions of intentional states to non-human animals based on the human model. The ascriptions may be quite correct, but Caleb is correct to identify the issue as an important one.
As I told Mike in an e-mail, I have found much of this discussion quite instructive, but I do think Paul Scott is an embarrassment for this blog. He can not follow an argument or represent someone else's position in a way that bears any relationship to what is being discussed. His witless interventions lead me to think it's not worth pursuing the matters here further, but I have benefitted from the comments of Caleb, Bob Hockett, Sherry, and Mike and they have given me "food for thought" (and this food causes no suffering, happily).
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What are your thoughts on this newscientist article? http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20327243.400-painfree-animals-could-take-suffering-out-of-farming.html?page=1 Engineering pain-free animals.
I second Rey's curiosity on the Vegans' position on growing meat, through cloning, with no brain or nervous system, in a a lab for mass production of meat that would not suffer in any way? I would think that Vegans' efforts would be better spent in encouraging this technological development rather than the impossible one of mandating Veganism.
If nonhuman animals are similar enough to humans to produce credible extrapolated test results, they must be similar enough to grant them equal moral consideration as humans, insofar as they not be used in unconsenting medical tests, for the same reasons we do not subject humans to unconsenting medical testing. Indeed, in the ways that warrant moral consideration, nonhuman animals are our equals. However, in many ways, such as LD50 experiments, all animals are different; different enough to ruin the credibility of extrapolation. Testing on animals will never tell us anything about humans, it will only tell us about animals.
For more detail: http://www.hughlafollette.com/papers/SPECIES.HTM
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什麼是呢？中文的意思是搜尋引擎最佳化的排名優化也是和seo的意思一樣都是指網路排名我們所提供的是全面性的排名行銷服務，對內幫助您的網站做網頁優化對外做搜尋引情自然搜尋的排名讓你的網站和搜尋引情談戀愛本公司專精於的工作，工程師常常為了做客戶的而忙到三經半夜網路排名的工作真的非常的繁鎖，我們提供完整的排名行銷服務從您公司網站的網頁優化到搜尋引情排名的自然搜尋都是我們所擅長的剛出社會工作的年輕人最大的夢想關鍵字到底是什麼玩意兒呢
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