Foolish Fixations and Useless Originalism
It is universally recognized by legal academics that originalism is not a single theory but rather a family of different approaches for judges to employ to interpret the United States Constitution. One clear example of this diversity of thought is that originalist judges and scholars who believe in "original meaning originalism" do not even agree on what is the appropriate target of their interpretive questions. Should judges be looking to what reasonable lay people thought was the original public meaning of the text when it was ratified or is it a search for what a hypothetical reasonable person would have thought the text meant? In cases where the text is legalistic, should originalists ask what legal experts in particular at the time thought the text meant, and if so, how legalistic does the text have to be to require that kind of search? There are strong disagreements among originalists on all these questions. There are many other examples of intramural disputes among ev...