My Unexpected Assessment of the Career of the Late Richard Posner
I never met Richard Posner. From what I have heard about him over the years, that was my loss, because he is widely regarded as not only unfailingly pleasant and polite but even a mensch. This is especially notable in that Posner was a product of -- and an important presence in -- the so-called Chicago School, which is the rigidly conservative school of thought that came out of the University of Chicago's economics department and law school in the latter half of the twentieth century.
The Chicago School is infamous for its toxicity -- both intramural (being nasty to each other, especially in seminars) and extramural (being nasty to everyone else) -- so Posner's kindness and equanimity must have been deeply ingrained in him from an early age to have survived intact after spending a lifetime in that atmosphere.
Professor Segall's two pieces containing both professional and personal remembrances of Judge Posner -- published here on Dorf on Law earlier this week, and also in 2019 -- are touching and poignant, painting a very positive portrait of the late intellectual and jurist. In his own piece two days ago, Professor Dorf certainly agreed: "Professor Segall offered a moving tribute to Judge Richard Posner, who died last week. Professor Segall was personally close with Judge Posner, but I do not think that his affection biased him."
Never having had the pleasure to meet the man, I can only comment on what I know of him through his scholarship and his legal opinions. I will state up front that I came to have positive feelings about him, but I should also concede that that is in large part because he changed his mind on important issues relatively late in life and ended up endorsing much of what I have long believed. And that, as Professor Segall emphasized, is one of the late judge's most admirable qualities: "After the 2008 economic collapse, he famously and publicly changed his views about free markets and law and economics, the subject areas he was most famous for influencing. He also publicly changed his views on same-sex marriage."
That is all to the good, of course. When I started law school in 1999, however, Posner was quite simply a bête noire for me and many legal academics. Indeed, because I had been an economics professor before starting law school at age 40, many of my professors at Michigan as well as professors I met at legal scholarship conferences asked me why I had decided to change fields. My cheeky but mostly serious answer was: "To fight against Richard Posner." Posner had been responsible for much of the work on the academic right to turn orthodox neoclassical economics -- markets, markets, markets!! -- into legal dogma. When some legal scholars had told me about this in the mid-1990's, I was incensed and energized.
By the time I finished law school, however, I had lost my fire about Posner in particular. This was not because I had any hint at his not-yet-revealed change of mind, which was still nearly a decade away. Instead, I had come to understand that there was honestly not much to fight against. But how can I say that, given Posner's importance as a judge and as a Chicago School leader -- and especially given how many of my own law professors would talk about Posner as if he were some kind of god?
The short answer is that I noticed pretty quickly that Posner was more of an eager enthusiast than a person who truly believed in the orthodox economic model. In the many Posner decisions that I was forced to read as a 1L, for example, I soon realized that his now-noted pragmatism made his opinions a challenge to read -- not because they were not engagingly written (they always were) or boring (they never were), but because he often seemed to be thinking out loud as he wrote.
For example, after reading a contract law opinion in which Posner veered back and forth between one or the other outcome multiple times, I told my Contracts professor that reading Posner could be like riding on a rollercoaster, that is, that he always seemed to get where he wanted to go, but unlike his ideological colleagues, he seemed to be doing so not as a zealot but by admitting in print that he was simply thinking it through and landing wherever he ultimately decided to land.
I had also by that point come across an excellent review of Posner's instantly-infamous book Sex and Reason by Stanford law professor Pam Karlan (Posner's Just So-Stories: The Phallacies of Sex and Reason, 1 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 229 (1993), apparently not available online), which introduced me to the term "just-so stories"; and Posner's book was full of them, a point that Professor Dorf echoed in his column two days ago. Again, what had seemed to me upon entering law school a mighty dragon to be slain turned out to be a guy with a lot of interests and impatience -- as Professor Dorf put it, "the number of things Posner got wrong ... appears to have been the product of a deliberate choice on his part to prioritize pushing out his ideas and arguments quickly, then moving on to other ideas and arguments" -- and thus not a genuine "school of thought" that required sustained attention.
Also like Professor Dorf, I understand that my comments here might be read as a bit of a backhanded compliment, but they are complimentary nonetheless. Please read on.
The longer answer to the question of why my fiery response to Posner had cooled by the time I received my J.D. was that it was very clear that his many fans on the Michigan Law faculty (replicated at nearly all law schools nationwide) were excited about his work not for practical reasons but because he provided an entree for legal scholars to pretend to be economists. As I have written many times, legal scholars -- despite their overweening egos -- as a group have a debilitating inferiority complex when it comes to economics. Economists, you see, supposedly bring rigor to their analyses in a way that legal scholars generally do not. That is nonsense on stilts, but it is very much the conventional wisdom among far too many legal scholars.
In addition, it was also by that point amusing when some of the true believers would talk about Posner being a good candidate for the faux-Nobel prize in economics. Professor Segall noted in his 2019 piece on Posner: "As Lincoln Kaplan once wrote, Posner’s 'approach to law, some legal scholars contend, makes the field worthy of a Nobel Prize—which he would win, many say, by acclamation.'" The key there is that Kaplan specified that legal scholars think that Posner was worthy of that prize. As much as I might criticize economics as a field in general and the factors that go into awarding that prize in particular, it never seemed imaginable to me that Posner's work -- other than its conservative policy outcomes -- would do much to impress self-impressed economists. Where was the advanced mathematics?
We will never know if I am wrong about that, because the ersatz award is not awarded posthumously, but people have known for quite a few years that Posner's health was failing. If there were a groundswell of people who thought he should be given the prize -- by acclamation or something less -- there was plenty of time to act. Kaplan is a journalist with a law degree who spends his time around law professors. He is exactly the willing target audience for "Posner as great economist" hype. Again, I am no fan of how big-time economists have ruined their field over the past eighty years, but my point here is simply that Posner was not one of them. And to be clear, that is all the better for Posner.
Moreover, my sense that Posnerite fandom had essentially become inside baseball for a certain type of legal wannabe was confirmed when a younger scholar named Eric Posner (yes relation) published "Economic Analysis of Contract Law after Three Decades," in which he concluded that the real-world impact of the Chicago School law-and-econ movement was decidedly minimal. To be clear, this was not a case of a rebellious son overturning his dad's work, as the younger Posner is very much a man of the academic and political right (and sometimes willing to make unwarranted leaps of logic to get there).
But while acknowledging that Posner père and Antonin Scalia had most definitely changed antitrust law (for the worse, in my opinion), it was clear by the beginning of this century that no one -- certainly including me -- needed "to fight Richard Posner." Even though we did not yet know that he was in the process of fighting himself in an unusually open-minded and healthy way, it simply was not the case that lawyers in general needed to know much about law-and-econ to be good practitioners.
In this way, Posner belongs in the same category as Ronald Coase, a Chicago School giant of the previous generation whose work has been misunderstood by his supposed followers in the legal academy. The so-called Coase Theorem as generally (mis)understood in law schools is silly, as most tellingly explained in Dan Usher's "The Coase theorem is tautological, incoherent or wrong" in 1998. And when legal scholars invoke the word "Coasean" with a knowing look, they usually mean little more than "negotiation-based." Deep.
And like Posner in his later years, Coase also deserves great credit for trying mightily to tell his self-professed followers that they are wrong to continue to believe. There are still people who call themselves Posnerites and Coaseans who reject their heroes' rejections, but whose fault is that?
In short, I understand why Richard Posner's unmistakable assets -- an engaging writing style, prodigious output, and decades of coming out on the conservative side of policy and political arguments -- would make him an icon in certain circles. But in the end, he was a remarkable figure who could be almost delightfully disorienting in his engagement with ideas, and who ultimately decided that his commitment to pragmatism and human decency mattered more than being iconic. That is a kind of courage and broad-mindedness that is far too rare among intellectuals.
- Neil H. Buchanan