Was Heller Based on an Inaccurate Quotation? Does it Matter?

On December 2, the Supreme Court will hear oral argument in Viramontes v. Cook County on the following question: "Whether the Second and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee the right to possess AR-15 platform and similar semiautomatic rifles." The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a challenge to Cook County Illinois's ban on assault rifles, relying on an earlier circuit court precedent that deemed such weapons indistinguishable from machine guns, which the Supreme Court declared proscribable in District of Columbia v. Heller.

The Seventh Circuit decision is wobbly under SCOTUS precedent.

Heller itself allows the outlawing of "weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes." The case appeared to use that language interchangeably with an inquiry into whether a class of weapons is "in common use" for those lawful purposes, and subsequent cases pretty clearly establish that "common use" is a threshold inquiry for firearms protection under the Second Amendment. If a weapon is in common use for lawful purposes, then it can be regulated only if the regulation is analogous to regulations that fit within the nation's history and tradition of firearms regulation.

Petitioners' argument is straightforward. Their brief characterizes the AR-15 as the "most popular rifle in the country," owned by approximately 26 million people and thus in common use. Full stop. Cook County does not deny that many people own AR-15s but contends that, to quote two headings in its brief, "Our Nation Has a Robust Tradition of Permitting the Regulation of Unusually Dangerous Weapons," AR-15s are unusually dangerous, and "Common Use Is Not Determinative of Constitutional Protection."

If there were no relevant precedent, Cook County would have the better argument by far, even assuming that the Heller Court was right (it wasn't) to treat the Second Amendment as protecting an individual right to possess firearms unconnected to militia service. That's because treating common use as determinative makes no sense. As Justice Breyer wrote in dissent in Heller, under the Court's

reasoning, if tomorrow someone invents a particularly useful, highly dangerous self-defense weapon, Congress and the States had better ban it immediately, for once it becomes popular Congress will no longer possess the constitutional authority to do so. In essence, the majority determines what regulations are permissible by looking to see what existing regulations permit. There is no basis for believing that the Framers intended such circular reasoning.

But to state the obvious, that was in dissent.

So, is Cook County bound to lose? Not necessarily. The brief also invokes the second half of the test, drawn from New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, arguing that the banning of AR-15s fits within the historical tradition of firearms regulation. Here too, I'd be inclined to be persuaded if a more enlightened Supreme Court were writing on a clean slate, but I highly doubt that this Court will find that an outright ban of a category of weapons that makes it past the common use threshold will qualify as a permissible regulation.

However, maybe I too quickly dismissed the criticism of the common use test. It's not just perverse, as Justice Breyer indicated. A recent New York Times story suggests that it is based on an erroneous quotation of Blackstone. En route to arriving at the common use threshold test, Justice Scalia, the author of the Heller majority opinion, allowed that there is an exception for "dangerous and unusual weapons." Here is the key language from Heller:

We also recognize another important limitation on the right to keep and carry arms. [United States v. Miller said] that the sorts of weapons protected were those “in common use at the time.” 307 U. S., at 179. We think that limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of “dangerous and unusual weapons.” See 4 Blackstone 148–149 (1769); 3 B. Wilson, Works of the Honourable James Wilson 79 (1804); J. Dunlap, The New-York Justice 8 (1815); C. Humphreys, A Compendium of the Common Law in Force in Kentucky 482 (1822); 1 W. Russell, A Treatise on Crimes and Indictable Misdemeanors 271–272 (1831); H. Stephen, Summary of the Criminal Law 48 (1840); E. Lewis, An Abridgment of the Criminal Law of the United States 64 (1847); F. Wharton, A Treatise on the Criminal Law of the United States 726 (1852). See also State v. Langford, 10 N. C. 381, 383–384 (1824); O’Neill v. State, 16 Ala. 65, 67 (1849); English v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 476 (1871); State v. Lanier, 71 N. C. 288, 289 (1874).

Note that the first source cited for the proposition that government could ban "dangerous and unusual weapons" is Blackstone but, as the Times story notes, Blackstone actually wrote that the government could ban dangerous or unusual weapons. Thus a weapon could be banned if it was dangerous even though not unusual. AR-15s, being owned by millions of Americans, are not unusual, i.e., they are in common use. Nonetheless, they are dangerous. Accordingly, the Times story suggests that a misquote of Blackstone will lead to carnage on the streets of Chicago.

But did Scalia actually misquote Blackstone? No, says Professor Jonathan Adler. He endorses an argument offered by attorney John Bash (who was Justice Scalia's law clerk when Heller was decided). Bash points out that while Blackstone said "or," some of the other sources Scalia cited said "and." Bash (quoted by Adler) goes on:

If the historical sources are mixed on the conjunctive or disjunctive framing, then it is true that there is an historical tradition of prohibiting weapons that are both dangerous and unusual, the narrower category that is encompassed by either framing.  The fact that Blackstone is the first citation is just because the treatise citations are in chronological order (consistent with making a point about historical tradition), followed by case citations also in chronological order.  The introduction of the treatise list with a "See" signal (rather than no signal) means that the quoted phrase is not necessarily a direct quote from each source (or any source)—as with the "See also" signal for the cases.  And assuming that it's correct that the conjunctive sources all trace back to a single 18th Century treatise, that would not detract from the point that learned commentators had endorsed or applied that test through early American history, which is the point the text is making about historical tradition.

That strikes me as wrong even on its own terms. Bash is saying here that there could be two traditions: one that allows the banning of weapons that are both dangerous and unusual, another that allows banning the banning of weapons that are dangerous or unusual. But if that's so, then there is a tradition of banning weapons that are dangerous or unusual, which is all that is needed under Heller (as filtered through Bruen) to uphold the banning of a category of weapons that is dangerous but not unusual, like AR-15s.

Meanwhile, the point about the "See" signal is confusing. Justice Scalia included a quotation. According to the Bluebook, if one offers a direct quote, then one shouldn't use a "See" signal but just provide the source of the quotation. (That was also true in 2008, when the 18th edition of the Bluebook was in effect, and the Supreme Court internal style guide did not differ on this point.) So maybe "dangerous and unusual" was not a quotation at all. Bash hints at this possibility when he says it's possible "that the quoted phrase is not necessarily a direct quote from. . . any source . . . ." In other words, it's possible that Scalia was using scare quotes.

But why would Scalia have done that? He wasn't using the phrase "dangerous and unusual" ironically. He was using it to announce a test. If he wanted to emphasize it, he could have used italics. Most readers of the passage with the quotation marks, however, would assume that Scalia was quoting something. And if he was quoting one or more of the other sources in the footnote, those sources should have come first with no preceding signal, with citations of Blackstone and other sources that phrased the test disjunctively following a signal such as the "See also" that precedes the cases. 

Thus, Justice Scalia was either misquoting and using the wrong signal or using scare quotes in a way that was certain to be misleading. We need not worry too much about whether Justice Scalia was simply being sloppy or was up to something nefarious, however. The key point made by the Times story is the one with which I led in replying to Adler and Bash: the actual historical sources provide support for a tradition of banning especially dangerous weapons even if they are widespread.

Will any of that make a difference in Viramontes? Of course not. Heller and its progeny are not an effort to derive constitutional meaning from a deep dive into Founding-era history or lexicology. They are, as Professor Reva Siegel argued persuasively in the aftermath of Heller, a contemporary response to the right-wing movement of the 1980s through early 2000s that sought to associate the Second Amendment with armed self-defense against private actors. The notion that the Roberts Court (or frankly, any Court) would reconsider its commitment to gun rights based on evidence that Blackstone didn't say what he was thought to have said is almost charmingly naïve.

I don't expect the Supreme Court to affirm the Seventh Circuit but if it surprises me and does so, that will be because, as in the Rahimi case, the prospect of ruling for the Second Amendment claimant is so repugnant to a majority of Justices that they will describe the late 18th and 19th century history at a sufficiently high level of generality to permit the law to stand. Or perhaps they'll just do it for . . . reasons . . . or possibly even for "reasons."

-- Michael C. Dorf