Saturday, November 22, 2014

The Inseparability of Policy Considerations and Resource Considerations in Federal Immigration and Marijuana Enforcement

by Michael Dorf

I begin by establishing my disinterested bona fides with respect to the dispute about whether the president has authority to defer deportation of, and other enforcement measures against, undocumented immigrants in certain favored categories. I do not consider myself an expert in immigration law and I shall try to set aside whatever views I might hold about immigration policy, which are, in any event, only those of a reasonably well informed citizen rather than an expert.

Back in December 2012, Prof. Buchanan and I wrote the following in one of our debt ceiling papers:
we find deeply troubling any suggestion that the president can simply choose not to enforce some law on the ground that he disagrees with the policy underlying that law. At a minimum, we would expect the president to offer some justification for not enforcing a law. With respect to marijuana possession and deferred action on unlawful immigration, the Obama Administration has invoked the traditional prosecutorial discretion that the executive branch enjoys in such matters. Perhaps that argument is persuasive; perhaps it is not.
What would make the argument more or less persuasive? I shall mostly consider immigration but I'll then double back to marijuana.

(1) It is possible to argue that the president has inherent authority to choose not to enforce any law he doesn't want to enforce for just about any reason. Professor Eric Posner arguably flirted with this idea back in August in response to a Ross Douthat NY Times piece, but even there, I think Posner was better read as making the much more modest claim that the president has prosecutorial discretion to allocate enforcement resources to the most serious offenses. Certainly that is the tune he is singing more recently.

(2) In any event and more importantly, the Obama Administration has not claimed anything other than prosecutorial discretion. The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) memo that provides the legal justification for the new policy (and for the limits on the new policy) begins (after some throat clearing) as follows:
As a general rule, when Congress vests enforcement authority in an executive agency, that agency has the discretion to decide whether a particular violation of the law warrants prosecution or other enforcement action. This discretion is rooted in the President’s constitutional duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” U.S. Const. art. II, § 3, and it reflects a recognition that the “faithful[]” execution of the law does not necessarily entail “act[ing] against each technical violation of the statute” that an agency is charged with enforcing. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).
After some further discussion, the memo then sets out four principles that govern the exercise of this discretion. They are: (i) Congress can limit the executive branch's prosecutorial discretion; (ii) "an agency’s enforcement decisions should be consonant with, rather than contrary to, the congressional policy underlying the statutes the agency is charged with administering"; (iii) "the Executive Branch ordinarily cannot, as the Court put it in Chaney, 'consciously and expressly adopt[] a general policy that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities' "; and (iv) "non-enforcement decisions are most comfortably characterized as judicially unreviewable exercises of enforcement discretion when they are made on a case-by-case basis."

The memo approves what became the Obama policy by characterizing it as an effort to assign priority to the 400,000 undocumented immigrants who can be removed with the allocated resources out of the 11.3 million who are present in the country. The policy satisfies principles (i)-(iii) because it broadly conforms to priorities set by Congress. It satisfies principle (iv) because it "provides a general framework for exercising enforcement discretion in individual cases, rather than establishing an absolute, inflexible policy of not enforcing the immigration laws in certain categories of cases."

(3)  In an intriguing post for a terrific symposium on Balkinization, Adam Cox and Cristina Rodriguez disagree with what they take to be a judgment in the OLC memo that Congress provides the principles that guide prosecutorial discretion. They argue that both in general and with respect to immigration policy, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion has been and legitimately should be guided by factors going beyond those articulated by the legislature. As they note, "prosecutors talk often of the fact that their job is to do justice, not scrutinize the criminal code for answers."

Although I agree with the Cox/Rodriguez position, I'm not sure that they offer a fair criticism of the OLC memo. As noted above in (2), the general criteria espoused in the memo do not say that the principles guiding prosecutorial discretion must be derived from congressional policy; they only say that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion must not contradict congressional policy. It's true, as Cox and Rodriguez note, that  the memo roots the policy of family unification in statutory provisions, but that's just overkill. Guidelines for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion that are derived from a statute enacted by Congress will surely be consistent with congressional policy. And that is all that the memo really says is necessary.

(4) I nonetheless think that Cox and Rodriguez are onto something fundamentally true in pointing to the inevitability of policy discretion in any exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Consider the decision of the Obama Administration to step back from enforcement of federal marijuana laws in states that have legalized medical or recreational marijuana. The August 2013 Justice Dep't memo on the topic is very clever. It notes that traditionally the feds have focused on trafficking, while leaving possession offenses to state enforcement. Even with states legalizing individual possession, the memo says that the feds can continue to focus on distribution-type offenses, because DOJ expects "that states and local governments that have enacted laws authorizing marijuana-related conduct will implement strong and effective regulatory and enforcement systems," and that these systems will ensure that state-legalized marijuana will not pose a threat to federal enforcement priorities.

Yet federal law forbids not only distribution but also possession of marijuana--even in small quantities for personal use, including medical use. The prior regime of federal (mostly) non-enforcement of the prohibition of mere possession of personal use quantities was based on a division of labor: the state and local authorities would be better at doing that. But once states legalized such use, that rationale no longer applied. The new rationale comes perilously close to violating pirnciple (iii) of the immigration memo: abdicating statutory responsibilities.

Suppose that a state legalizes hate crimes. If the DOJ had previously relied on state prosecutors to go after low-level hate crimes while saving its resources for a sub-category of federal law consisting of more serious hate crimes, wouldn't the state's legalization decision be a reason for the DOJ to devote more resources to enforcement efforts in that state, not fewer, as with the marijuana example? What's the difference?

I think the obvious answer is that the Obama Administration (like any administration, one hopes) is more sympathetic to low-level marijuana possession than to low-level hate crimes. Even if one thinks that the decision to focus attention on traffickers is permissibly rooted in judgments about how best to marshall resources, those judgments are closely related to normative judgments about the relative importance or even wisdom of various provisions of law.

(5) And that was all pretty obvious in President Obama's announcement of his immigration policy. His argument is not that it's regrettable that the government lacks the resources to deport all 11.3 million undocumented immigrants but that's the triage he must perform to best use the limited resources Congress has given him. His argument instead is that the law ought not to permit, much less require, deportation, for millions of people in that group. Hostility to certain aspects of the law is, in this instance and many others, part and parcel of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion on ostensible grounds of scarce enforcement resources.

(6) Having said all of that, I doubt that anyone has standing to challenge the exercise of prosecutorial discretion--although standing doctrine is notoriously manipulable for ideological ends. Even assuming a justiciable case could be brought, I think that the inevitability of wide-ranging policy considerations in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion should make it very hard for a court to say that a president has, in the guise of triaging resources, really just abdicated his responsibility under the Take Care Clause.

But that doesn't mean that the president has no duty under the Take Care Clause. Here, as elsewhere, the Constitution may limit a president's options even if no court will enforce those limits. Whether President Obama has transgressed those limits seems to me a closer question than partisans on either side have acknowledged. To my mind, the judicially unenforceable constitutional norm goes something like this: A president may not use considerations of resource allocation merely as a pretext for undermining a law that he would prefer to simply not enforce regardless of resources.

It's hard to know whether President Obama has violated that norm because so much of his political rhetoric that sounds in naked abdication--such as "we can't wait"--is, after all, political rhetoric. Insofar as the more limited and sober OLC memo formed the real basis for the shape of the ultimate policy, the president may be able to say that the rhetoric was always just puffery. Of course, if I'm right that any court challenge would not get past a motion to dismiss, he need only make this excuse to himself and to the court of public opinion.

How this will ultimately play out politically remains to be seen, but my money is on Obama "winning" this confrontation for two reasons. First, the public tends to focus more on the substantive merits of a policy than what we lawyers see as battles over basic structural principles like separation of powers or federalism; the fact that much of the Republican opposition to the policy is procedural is something of a concession that he will win the policy debate. And second, much of the opposition to Obama's policy is over the top.

As I've explained here, there is a legitimate question of whether this policy and many others pursued in the past by presidents of both parties push the notion of prosecutorial discretion too far; and a genuine assertion of power to exercise prosecutorial discretion not to enforce a law at all in the face of a contrary congressional judgment would be a serious threat to separation of powers. So to the extent that Obama's immigration policy ends up being used politically as a precedent for truly dangerous executive overreach by a future (Republican or Democratic) president, I worry that my friends who signed a scholars' letter that makes the same sorts of measured arguments found in the OLC memo may live to regret doing so.

19 comments:

egarber said...

A few questions / comments

1. Aren't deferrals something different than refusal to execute the "law at all"?

2. Even though policy preference is an obvious dimension here, I also think the resource scarcity challenge is real. So doesn't the real test just become whether it's rational to focus on criminals first, while ensuring the deferrals aren't something permanent?

3. Taking it a step further, is it possible that deferrals are actually the *best* way to execute the law in this instance? Meaning, I can't do everything at once, so I'm carrying it out in view of the entire problem space. Do presidents have a responsibility to fill gaps across the entire problem while long-term fixes are underway - to make things the most stable? Or on the other side, would it be more careful and better to go after criminals (with the limited resources) and do nothing elsewhere?

Steven Shiffrin said...

Mike, excellent post. The Wall Street Journal had an op-ed piece yesterday (or the day before) in which it suggested that a Republican President under the Obama rationale could decide not to prosecute those who did not pay the "tax" approved by Roberts in the Affordable Care Act, and Reagan gave a similar argument with respect to those who did not pay the capital gains tax before too much criticism forced him to back off. It seems clear that the IRS does not have sufficient resources to enforce the tax laws. Would the principles of the Obama policy permit a Republican President to engage in this form of prosecutorial discretion?

David Ricardo said...

The lack of prosecution already takes place on a massive scale in the area of taxes. The IRS lacks anywhere near the resources to enforce the tax laws and so uses prosecutorial discretion to selectively enforce the tax regs. In fact one of the major anti-tax strategies of conservatives is to deny the IRS the resources to enforce the tax laws so that they can give high income/high net worth individual a de facto tax cut through lack of prosecution.

On a technical note, could the Federal government use the technique of the 'plea bargain' as a pretext for allowing undocumented residents to remain in the country. That is, could the process the President outlined be structured as a plea bargain (undocumented residents plead guilty and register, pay back taxes etc) in return for not being deported?

egarber said...

With the IRS examples, is there a difference between not collecting the tax and deferring it because of resource scarcity? And is that distinction meaningful in determining whether a president goes too far?

Michael C. Dorf said...

These are all great questions and comments. I'll just say for now that perhaps an argument could be made to distinguish tax non-enforcement (for the ACA or in other contexts) based on the language of the relevant statutes, but I haven't done the hard work. I'll mull over comments and return with a follow-up post at some point.

Thanks!

egarber said...

I also see this distinction:

If the president applies resources in the spirit of optimized revenue collections, he is pretty safe. But if he is simply gaming the opportunity to give rich folks a break, that likely isn't rationally connected to the intent of core tax laws.

Going after criminals first is rational in the immigration context.

egarber said...

As a political strategy, Obama probably did the equivalent of letting the walkers out in the Republican camp**. If there was a chance before, there is little hope now that House Republicans will support anything "moderate." John and Mitch have their hands full.

And the ensuing ugliness will only hurt the GOP in 2016, given the nation's demographic shift.

**pardon the Walking Dead reference :)


Joe said...

An interesting post though the last paragraph is a bit confusing - what "truly dangerous executive overreach" are we talking about here that is "truly dangerous" but still (to quote the summary to the linked letter) is "consistent with governing law and with the policies that Congress has expressed in the statutes that it has enacted" as well (I'm pretty sure this is a fair addendum) not in violation of some other constitutional concern (e.g., the 4A or some other liberty interest)? The letter speaks of "limits" of discretion etc.

Anyway, given the official submission of the House lawsuit, which is by my understanding an argument of executive overreach as to proper enforcement of the law, perhaps a follow-up post would be appropriate or a good idea for a Verdict column.

For now, enjoy a nice slice of pie.

Joseph Simmons said...

I don't think I could agree more with what you've written. I have found it difficult to explain why a "judicially unenforceable constitutional norm" matters, particularly in this close case. As you explain, to say to others it is about good government or being on guard against later abuses of authority only goes so far.

Leigh Osofsky said...

I have recently posted a full-length (working) paper regarding whether categorical nonenforcement of the tax law is legitimate. The ssrn link is http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2513349. To preview the conclusion, I argue that the distinctions between: (1) categorical nonenforcement and setting priorities and (2) nonenforcement motivated by enforcement resource limitation and nonenforcement motivated by policy do not hold up well when examining the realities of agency nonenforcement. I also argue that categorical nonenforcement can under, certain circumstances, actually help legitimate inevitable nonenforcement of the tax law. Perhaps this is of interest to you or your readers.

Teresa Vue said...

Well, Defending noncitizens in removal/deportation proceedings and Obtaining permanent residence ("green cards") for family or employment are few of the benefits provided by immigration lawyers in USA

Elizabeth J. Neal said...

I do not consider myself an expert in immigration law and I shall try to set aside whatever views I might hold about immigration policy, which are, in any event, only those of a reasonably well informed citizen rather than an expert. case management software

amine lahragui said...

thanks so much for that great blog and thanks also for accepting my links thanks
طريقة عمل الدونات طريقة عمل البان كيك طريقة عمل الكنافة طريقة عمل البسبوسة طريقة عمل الكيك طريقة عمل عجينة البيتزا فوائد القرفه

obat herbal said...

penyebab dan cara mengobati wasir penyembuhan penyakit wasir yang aman tips mengobati wasir yang aman tanpa wasir pada wanita

herbal medicine said...

obat wasir resep ampuh obat wasir paling mujarab obat wasir herbal tradisional obat wasir yang untuk ibu hamil

obat herbal said...

obat wasir resep ampuh obat wasir paling mujarab obat wasir herbal tradisional obat wasir yang untuk ibu hamil

lionelmessi10 said...

kelamin pria keluar nanah cara mengobati kemaluan keluar nanah kelamin keluar nanah alat kelamin keluar cairan nanah cara mengobati kelamin keluar nanah obat penyakit sipilis nanah keluar dari penis penyakit penis keluar nanah obat penis keluar nanah cara menngobati kencing nanah pada pria herbal gonore cara mengobati kelamin keluar nanah

lionelmessi10 said...

sexually transmitted infection (STI) It is caused by infection with the bacterium Neisseria gonorrhoeae It infects warm moist areas of the body Gonorrhea is transmitted by unprotected oral anal or vaginal sex People who have multiple sexual partners and who do not use a condom are at greatest risk of infection The best protection against infection is abstinence monogamy (having only one sexual partner) or condom use Behaviors that make a person more likely to engage in unprotected sex also increase the likelihood of infection These include alcohol abuse or abuse of illegal drugs

obat herbal said...

Obat kencing Nanah De Nature Obat Herbal obat Kutil Kelaminobat gejala herpes kelamin dan pengobatan herpes kelamin dan cara mengobati kanker payudara dan cara mengobati kanker paru dan cara menyembuhkan kanker dan pengobatan kanker dan pengobatan kanker dari china dan obat kanker serviks dan obat kanker herbal dan obat kanker alami ampuh dan obat kanker ampuh dan obat ampuh kanker usus merupakan solusi pengobatan herbal dari denature indonesia