The Important Countermajoritarian Difficulty
Constitutional law scholars have long fretted over the "countermajoritarian difficulty" (CMD) a term coined by Alexander Bickel for an old issue: The fact that, except in the extraordinarily rare case of a blatant and obvious violation of the Constitution, judicial invalidation of legislative and executive action substitutes the views of unelected judges for those of officials who are accountable to the people. Within constitutional theory, there are various responses, ranging from those that offer interpretive methods deemed legitimate in light of the CMD to those that say that the CMD is not worth worrying about. Meanwhile, I and others have previously noted that whatever one thinks of the CMD created by judicial review, its scope is not all that great, because the courts do not use the Constitution to interfere with the decisions of the political branches on such great matters as war and peace, taxation, and spending. Lately, that fact has become painfully obvious, even ...