There Will be Never Be Anyone Like Him Again: RIP Judge Richard Posner
An unusual thing happened on October
8, 2019, during the Supreme Court oral arguments in Bostock
v. Clayton County and Altitude Express,
Inc., v. Zarda. These cases raised
the important questions whether sexual orientation discrimination and transgender discrimination
were covered by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Neither case came
from the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit but that did not stop Chief Justice
Roberts from asking the plaintiffs’ attorney Pamela Karlan, a skilled litigator and Stanford Law Professor, the following question right out
of the gate:
How do you -- do you agree or disagree with Judge Posner's statement that the statute should be read to encompass sexual orientation discrimination 'to avoid placing the entire burden of updating old statutes on the legislative branch?' (quotation marks in the official Court transcript).
The question was odd because Roberts was referring to an opinion Posner had written in a different case that raised the same legal issues but was not before the Court. Moreover, the opinion was a concurrence, not a panel opinion. The Chief, who would eventually vote for Karlan’s clients, made it clear through his tone that he did not like Posner’s concurring opinion.
Karlan answered the question in the negative and told me years later she knew
she had to answer the question that way to give her clients the best
chance of winning. She was right.
Why was Chief Justice Roberts's first question about a concurring opinion that was written in a case not before
the Court? The answer is obvious: because the author of that opinion was Judge
Richard Posner, the legal legend who passed away last week after a long bout with Alzheimer's. Below is the full
context of the quote Roberts used for his question, and please keep in mind the precise issue the justices
had to resolve: Were sexual orientation and transgender-status discrimination covered by Title VII's prohibition on discrimination "based on sex,” even
though no one living at the time of the passage of Title VII thought the law
applied to sexual orientation or transgender-status discrimination. Roberts’s snippy
question did not come close to capturing what Posner actually wrote (please
forgive the long quote):
Interpretation can mean giving a fresh meaning to a statement—a meaning that infuses the statement with vitality and significance today. An example of this last form of interpretation… is the Sherman Antitrust Act, enacted in 1890, long before there was a sophisticated understanding of the economics of monopoly and competition. Times have changed; and for more than thirty years the Act has been interpreted in conformity to the modern, not the nineteenth-century, understanding of the relevant economics.... Statutes and constitutional provisions frequently are interpreted on the basis of present need and present understanding rather than original meaning….
The majority opinion states that Congress in 1964 “may not have realized or understood the full scope of the words it chose.” This could be understood to imply that the statute forbade discrimination against homosexuals but the framers and ratifiers of the statute were not smart enough to realize that....
I would prefer to see us acknowledge openly that today we, who are judges rather than members of Congress, are imposing on a half-century-old statute a meaning of “sex discrimination” that the Congress that enacted it would not have accepted. This is something courts do fairly frequently to avoid statutory obsolescence and concomitantly to avoid placing the entire burden of updating old statutes on the legislative branch. We should not leave the impression that we are merely the obedient servants of the 88th Congress (1963–1965), carrying out their wishes. We are not. We are taking advantage of what the last half century has taught.
Judge
Posner’s description of what he was doing when he voted for the plaintiff in Hively
was far more truthful and transparent than the textualist nonsense employed
by Justice Gorsuch when he reached the same conclusion Posner did in Gorsuch's majority
opinion in Bostock. Judges regularly update old statutes, including Title VII in previous cases. In short, neither the Chief Justice nor Justice Gorsuch “could handle
the truth" about statutory interpretation, which is that imprecise language in old statutes requires new interpretations consistent with contemporary values, politics, and priorities.
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In September, 2013, I was talking to Judge Posner during one of our weekly recorded conversations when he told me that he thought he had decided a major voter ID case incorrectly. He had ruled in Crawford v. Marion County that Indiana’s voter ID law was constitutional and now regretted his vote. I asked him if he would like to issue that statement publicly. He said, “of course,” as if obviously judges should admit when they are wrong.
A short time later, I arranged for him to go on a show called “Huff Post Live,” with my friend Mike Sacks. The result made headlines like this: “Court of Appeals judge admits he was wrong to uphold voter ID law.”
Just a few days later, Justice Stevens, who wrote the majority opinion for the Court in Crawford affirming Posner’s decision, said that, although he stood by his opinion given the state of the record before the Court at the time, he also thought that history had shown Justice Souter’s dissent in the case to be correct because “as a matter of actual history, he’s dead right. The impact of the statute is much more serious," than Stevens had previously thought.
Whatever one thinks of Justice Stevens's remarks, the conversation was important and triggered by Posner's ability to admit his own errors.
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I talked to Judge Posner (who insisted everyone call him Dick because he thought titles were dumb) about once a week on the record for several years. I originally thought I might write a biography of him, but we became close friends. My wife and I had a number of meals with Dick and his wife Charlene, and the four of us had great times together. My kids played with his famous cat Pixie, who I once suggested should run for President (Pixie not Posner). Over time, I knew that I had lost my objectivity about this towering figure.
How towering was Posner? He loved data, so consider:
He issued over 3,300 judicial opinions and, unlike almost all other federal judges, he wrote the first drafts of his opinions.
He wrote over fifty books on topics as diverse as sex, national security, philosophy, and of course law & economics.
He wrote over five hundred scholarly articles, many of them when he was a judge, not a full-time academic.
According to one 2021 study, Posner was at the time the most cited legal scholar in history by a large margin. To be clear, this was a study of articles and books, not judicial opinions.
Because Posner was so prolific, and had such an intense intellectual curiosity, he often waded into complex academic subjects where experts often disagreed with his work. He was a polarizing figure in this regard. His debates with Ronald Dworkin in the New York Review of Books were legendary.
I also interviewed Posner for that publication (here, sadly behind a paywall). Posner said several provocative things during that conversation, but the one the media picked up on was his belief that law clerks are often smarter than their judges. True or not, Posner never shied away from saying what he believed to be true, and that transparency was also a hallmark of his judicial opinions.
In addition to being one of the founders of the Law & Economics movement, and one of the most influential antitrust and torts scholars in the country, Posner is perhaps most famous for his legal pragmatism. He had no use for legal formalisms, which often hide the balancing of values and consequences that drive most judicial decisions. His book "How Judges Think," is, I believe, one of the best books on judging ever written. Posner believed that judges faced with hard legal issues have an initial instinct about how the case should be decided and then determine whether formal legal materials block that result. I believe that description is almost universally true, even for judges who claim fidelity to text and history.
Long before I met him, Posner described the Supreme Court in his Foreword to the Harvard Law Review as a "political court," different from other judicial tribunals. He ended that famous article with this quote from William Shakespeare: "O, it is excellent To have a giant's strength, but it is tyrannous To use it like a giant." A perfect quote from a man whose mother read him Shakespeare when he was a young boy.
It has been almost a week since Dick passed away, and there have been many moving tributes. Previously on this blog, I shared a great deal about our friendship and how much he meant to me personally. I will not repeat here what I wrote in that lengthy piece, but I hope readers will go back to it, as it contains many examples of Dick's incredible generosity towards me and others.
I will close by saying that I have never met a person so intellectually curious, so smart and well-informed, so practical, and so willing to admit he was wrong when he was wrong. His judging, based on thoughtful consideration of consequences, was transparent to a fault, which is something we desperately need today. He was brilliant, honest, and often acerbic publicly, and funny, warm, and generous in person.
But mostly, at least for today, he was my dear friend who supported me in every way a friend can be supportive. The finality of death can be overwhelming even when someone has been ill for so long. But his deep laugh, his wry smile, and his penetrating wit will be with me forever.
But I do miss him so very, very much. RIP Judge Richard (Dick) Posner. There will never be anyone like you ever again.
Eric Segall