by Michael C. Dorf
Today on Verdict you can find Prof Colb's discussion of the recent cert grant in Ramos v. Louisiana, which poses the question whether the Sixth Amendment is fully incorporated against the states. In 1972 in Apodaca v. Oregon, the Court said that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial in serious criminal cases in state court but does not incorporate it jot-for-jot; thus, although the Sixth Amendment requires unanimous juries in federal court, the Fourteenth Amendment permits conviction by a less-than-unanimous jury in state court.
Actually, the Court did not say that. Only Justice Powell did. All of the other justices thought that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Sixth jot-for-jot, but some thought both require unanimity and others thought neither requires unanimity. Powell was in the middle and thus his opinion (in the companion case of Johnson v. Louisiana) was controlling, but he was the only justice who thought that a right could be incorporated against the states but not as demanding of the states as it is of the federal government.
Prof Colb's column focuses on the benefits of unanimity and argues in favor of applying the unanimity rule in state courts as a means of reinforcing the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. I highly recommend it. In the balance of this post, however, I want to talk a bit more about incorporation of the Bill of Rights.
In the last decade, the Supreme Court has twice cast doubt on the continuing vitality of Apodaca/Johnson. A footnote in Justice Alito's 2010 opinion in McDonald v. Chicago (incorporating the Second Amendment) and another in Justice Ginsburg's opinion last month in Timbs v. Indiana (incorporating the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment) both indicate that the general rule is jot-for-jot incorporation. In light of these opinions, it seems very likely that the Court will drop the other shoe in Ramos: It will say that Justice Powell's opinion in Apodaca/Johnson, while hitherto controlling in the lower courts, never commanded a majority of the SCOTUS and is thus not entitled to the full force of horizontal precedent; it will then find that the Fourteenth Amendment does indeed incorporate the unanimity requirement of the Sixth Amendment.
Predictions aside, it's worth taking note of an oddity. Incorporation of the Bill of Rights was mostly a mid-20th-century project. By the early 1970s, it was conventional wisdom that Hugo Black -- who favored full jot-for-jot incorporation -- had lost the battle but won the war against Felix Frankfurter -- who opposed incorporation except to the extent that a provision of the Bill of Rights happened to be fundamental to the Anglo-American system of justice. Black had lost the battle, because there were exceptions to incorporation, but he had won the war, because the exceptions were few and far between. There matters stood for the better part of four decades.
What accounts for the long dormancy of incorporation cases and their recent revival? Three data points -- McDonald, Timbs, and Ramos -- provide an admittedly small sample from which to generalize. It is possible to point to factors that make the trend look more like a coincidence. The Court did not find an individual right to own firearms in the Second Amendment until 2008, so it had no prior occasion in the modern era to consider whether the Fourteenth incorporated it. Meanwhile, Timbs may be understood as a response to a relatively recent pattern of states and localities seizing and keeping valuable property; in this view, the Court had no prior occasion to consider whether the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Excessive Fines Clause because until recently states were not imposing excessive fines.
Without fully discounting those explanations, I suspect that something else is also going on. After all, the Ramos grant is hard to explain as a response to some idiosyncrasy regarding unanimity. There has been no recent increase in non-unanimous state juries. On the contrary, Ramos itself will have no prospective effect in Louisiana, which has abolished non-unanimous juries, leaving Oregon as the only state that uses them, and pending state court litigation or legislation might soon end the practice there as well. The Court appears to have taken Ramos to "clean up" its incorporation jurisprudence for its own sake.
But the cleanup effort is curious. One can invoke reasons of federalism in favor of allowing states greater latitude under the Fourteenth Amendment than the court allows the federal government under the Bill of Rights. Whether one does so pursuant to the Brandeisian idea that states can serve as experimental laboratories of democracy or pursuant to a more hard-edged notion of residual state sovereignty, traditional arguments for departures from jot-for-jot incorporation give states greater latitude. One might even connect this sort of rejection of jot-for-jot to the idea of a "margin of appreciation" in international human rights law.
Meanwhile, as I explained in a Verdict column and an accompanying blog post last week (and as Prof Josh Blackman wrote in an article called Originalism at the Right Time?), the Court's self-described originalists ought to be prepared in some contexts to enforce constitutional rights more strictly against the states than the federal government in those contexts in which the meaning of a right came to be broader (and thus the meaning of its restriction on government stricter) between 1791 (when the Bill of Rights was ratified) and 1868 (when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified). I also offered a functional justification for such a doctrine, based on Madison's logic in Federalist 10.
Yet despite plausible arguments for interpreting (some) rights differently as between the states and the federal government, the Court seems strongly committed to jot-for-jot incorporation. And to be clear, I do not oppose jot-for-jot incorporation, which strikes me as having the great virtue of simplicity. Still, given the substantial disagreements among the justices about the substance of constitutional rights, it's a little odd that there is seemingly widespread agreement that, whatever their substance, they should be the same as applied to the states and the federal government.
That oddity is explained, I think, by the fact that incorporation has been largely successful. Again, there continue to be substantial controversies over particular rights. How, if at all, do the First and Fourteenth Amendment restrict campaign finance regulation? What is the scope of the right to keep and bear arms? What limits do the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments place on the death penalty? Etc. But these controversies somehow have little impact on the generally shared commitment to applying rights against both the federal and state governments.
Assuming that the Court in Ramos overrules Apodaca/Johnson, the remaining frontier will be those rights that the Court has not incorporated at all: the Third Amendment; the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment; and the Seventh Amendment right to a jury in civil cases. In McDonald, Justice Alito suggested (in footnote 13) that all three could eventually be incorporated. He noted that the Court has never decided whether to incorporate the Third Amendment and that the cases that rejected incorporation of the grand jury and the civil jury "long predate the era of selective incorporation."
The Court could almost certainly incorporate the Third Amendment without causing much of a stir, because there are vanishingly few circumstances in which states would attempt to quarter troops in private homes. Any controversy would likely involve some sort of penumbral Third Amendment claim (as in question 2 of my con law exam last semester). The Court's ability to fashion properly limited doctrine would prevent any ruling from overwhelming state resources.
The same is not entirely true of the grand jury and civil jury. About half the states use grand juries to charge serious offenses. Those that do not routinely use them typically have a procedure whereby they can use grand juries. Requiring all states to use grand juries in felony cases would impose a burden on those that do not currently use them, while doing little for the benefit of defendants, given the conventional wisdom that grand juries, which receive one-sided presentations of evidence, essentially rubber-stamp prosecutions.
State courts routinely use civil juries but not in all of the circumstances in which the Seventh Amendment requires for the federal courts. Applying all of the requirements of the Seventh Amendment to state courts would add to the expense of state court litigation and in some states would place a greater burden on citizens called for jury duty.
Accordingly, there is no good policy reason for the Court to incorporate the Third Amendment, the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment, or the Seventh Amendment, while with respect to the latter two there would be substantial costs. If the Court takes cases to do so, it would be an example of the doctrine working itself pure rather than the justices responding to any real need.
Yes it will be nice if the Court does incorporate the sixth amendment fully. But here is what the conservatives may say is the proper law.ReplyDelete
1. Conviction of a white defendant - unanimous
2. Conviction of a person of Hispanic descent
If Legal Resident - 80%
If Undocumented - 60%
3. Conviction of an African American - 40% *
* but southern states may have a standard of 20%
4. Conviction of a law enforcement officer shooting an unarmed African American - 100% plus 2 additional votes.
Apologize for the cynicism but still trying to process how a President firing an FBI Director to stop a criminal probe of the President is not Obstruction of Justice.
Perhaps this is a drive for the purity of the legal theory of original public meaning originalism what with the great legal wisdom generated since the mid 1970s in the disclosures of original public meanings as of 1791 and as of 1868 respectably of the ratifications of the Bill of Rights and of the 14th A than had been the case for so many years especially after 1868.ReplyDelete
Via Twitter, I saw that Prof. Segall apparently changed his mind on the unenumerated rights argument he was planning to make and summarized in a recent post here.ReplyDelete
He basically seemed to take an approach akin to Prof. Dorf's reply -- if you are going to be concerned about judicial restraint, there is nothing really special about unenumerated rights in practice. After all, he doesn't think courts are restrained much by text in practice anyhow. So, he made a new presentation.
On the point of this post, the failure to complete the incorporation process can be explained fairly simply, perhaps. First, until recently, the justices weren't a big fan of an individual rights view of the Second Amendment. Second, the Third Amendment is a sort of joker. As to the Fines Clause, Justice Stevens in an opinion earlier this century suggested it was incorporated years ago. The specific concern for property forfeitures does raise a modern day concern to clearly do so.
That leaves juries -- the justices basically left the states have some discretion here, and this was a thing back to the beginning, where differences over how the states handled civil juries in particular affected the writing of Art. III. Since only two (now one) state actually didn't have unanimous juries, it is a bit curious they didn't complete the job there. But, as suggested, that partially was a result of membership -- Powell split the baby. Precedent kicked in but the 2A incorporation raised the question of a one size fits all rule again.
I read an article recently pushing for a full incorporation of the trial provisions that suggested incorporation of the civil juries provision would be most notable regarding smaller claims. Grand juries would be the biggest change -- many states don't have such a requirement. Also, there is some dispute on how helpful they are big picture. A similar dispute doesn't seem to be flagged for most provisions of the Bill of Rights. The dispute (up to a point) on guns suggests the special nature of the 2A.
The Legal History Blog has this March 24, 2019 post:ReplyDelete
"Kurt T. Lash, University of Richmond School of Law, has posted The Enumerated Rights Reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause: A Response to Randy E. Barnett and Evan D. Bernick's “The Privileges or Immunities Clause, Abridged: A Critique of Kurt Lash on the Fourteenth Amendment”:"
The abstract is provided at that blog.(as well as a link to the Lash response. The search for original public meaning of the 14th A goes on.
I'm sure just one more sixty page law article will clarify things.ReplyDelete
Very interesting post.ReplyDelete
Rather than consistency as the justification for "jot for jot", would not the Supremacy Clause make more sense? While some states can give greater protection to individual rights than the federal government, no state can give less protection to individual rights -- because of the Supremacy Clause. I always found Apodaca the one violation of this basic idea, and I never understood the hesitancy for unanimity in criminal jury trials given the history at the Founding. And I thought the Brandeis laboratory of the states argument only applied to either expansion of rights or statutes that do not violate a constitutional principle.
Joe, Barnett and Bernick's paper runs 69 pages and Lash's response runs 106 pages. The former promise to provide more papers in the future on the original public meaning of the "privileges or immunities" clause of the 14th A. But I assume they should first respond to Lash's response to their critique of him. They believe Sen. Howard over Lash. But what about John Bingham? All this to restore the vitality of Lochner? Or a revival of original intent originalism?ReplyDelete
Ah. Well, I was thinking of a past article that was closer to sixty.ReplyDelete
There is currently not a requirement that criminal juries have twelve members (see, e.g., Williams v. Florida) and this sentence from that opinion to me has wide application:
We do not pretend to be able to divine precisely what the word "jury" imported to the Framers, the First Congress, or the States in 1789.
The Supremacy Clause requires that states apply the Constitution above and beyond its own individual laws but the question here is if the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment should "jot by jot" incorporate the original Bill of Rights.
So, the application arguably is question begging.
Query: Is it clear that incorporation of certain rights into the 14th A results from its "due process" clause as well as its "privileges or immunities" clause? Are there any distinctions as to which clause? "Jot-by-jot" incorporation of some such rights (1st 8 As of Bill of Rights) may have been on the minds of some of the Framers of the 14th A. But that's not the same as original public meaning of the text of the 14th A.ReplyDelete
We look thru the glass darkly, to paraphrase Paul (from the Bible).ReplyDelete
It is somewhat interesting to wonder about the different techniques here though the "original public meaning" very well not have parse things too closely. There was a general concern here (especially regarding making sure the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was protected) but the general understanding of the specifics of the nuances of this question was a lot less clear.
At least, that is what I have taken from my readings over the years. A good case can be made that "due process" would require less than "privileges or immunities," which very well referenced specific things (toss in things like habeas or limits on ex post facto laws) at the very least and accepted things as previously understood as applied to the federal government.
For instance, "privileges or immunities" popped up when determining the protections of new citizens that came in via the Louisiana Purchase or the treaty ending the Mexican War. But, the "public meaning" (including by those who ratified it) is likely cloudy. Still, reading those long articles can be interesting and useful (in the right frame of mind).
The "privileges or immunities" clause of the 14th specifies protection for citizens of the US. Might this limit certain rights incorporated by this clause to such citizens? If so, perhaps incorporation via the 14th A's "due process" clause may benefit people who are not citizens of the US.ReplyDelete
Here's a blog post by Kurt LashReplyDelete
in which he states that the Slaughterhouse Cases were correctly decided. Is there a neat bow to place on 14th A incorporation via either its "due process" clause of "privileges or immunities" clause for citizens of the US and/or just plain "people."
Over at the Originalism Blog, there have even a couple of recent posts on Kurt Lash, one of which provided the link in my preceding comment. Is this another internal clash of originalists?ReplyDelete
A new post at Balkinization complains about "cafeteria originalism."ReplyDelete
Segall replies on Twitter that is how originalism usually is applied.
AKA "smorgasbord originalism" or "lean originalism"?ReplyDelete