Monday, November 18, 2013

The Utility and Pitfalls of Dishonesty in Adjudication

By Mike Dorf

Two unrelated cases currently in the news illustrate the utility--and pitfalls--of dishonesty in adjudication.  First consider the ongoing imbroglio over the 2d Cir panel's disqualification of Judge Scheindlin in the stop-and-frisk litigation, about which Prof. Kalhan has blogged here and here, while I have blogged here.  In its initial October 31 order, the panel concluded "that the District Judge ran afoul of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges, Canon 2 ('A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.')." Then, last week, the panel issued a superseding opinion that "clarified" its earlier order as follows: "we referenced the Code of Conduct for United States Judges. We now clarify that we did not intend to imply in our previous order that Judge Scheindlin engaged in misconduct cognizable either under the Code of Conduct or under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act."

Right.  The panel is right that its initial order did not imply that Judge Scheindlin had violated the Code of Conduct; the initial order actually said that.  So the clarifying opinion is in fact not a clarification but a reversal--except of course that the panel did not reverse its actual decision disqualifying Judge Scheindlin.  This is so obviously dishonest to anyone who reads the order and the "clarifying" opinion that one can only assume that the panel believed that writing a dishonest opinion was better than its alternatives.

What were those alternatives? One would have been for the panel to withdraw its initial order and reinstate Judge Scheindlin. Another would have been for the panel to stick to its guns or double down. I assume that the panel was unwilling to withdraw its initial order due to some combination of pride (i.e., unwillingness to confess error) and result-orientation (i.e., the view that even if Judge Scheindlin didn't commit a technical violation of the ethical rules, she bent the law to get the substantive outcome she wanted and so the panel was justified in bending the disqualification rules to try to get the substantive outcome it thinks is right, given the time constraints imposed by the coming change in mayor).  With the option of reversal effectively off the table, a dishonest opinion that aims to reassure the world that Judge Scheindlin is a good and honorable judge was better for the panel than an honest doubling down that might have risked en banc reversal.

Thus, in the stop-and-frisk disqualification satellite litigation, dishonesty served the interests of the Second Circuit panel judges.  Whether it served the interests of justice and the broader public is a harder question, but we can find cases where dishonest rulings do appear to serve these wider interests. Consider Establishment Clause litigation.

Under a very straightforward and seemingly obvious reading of the Establishment Clause, all government invocations of the Divine (as opposed to, say, purely historical or cultural references) would be forbidden.  An official motto such as "In God We Trust" on the money or the phrase "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance would be recognized as unconstitutional for the message of exclusion such endorsements send to atheists, agnostics and polytheists.  So too, official prayers at the beginning of legislative sessions would be impermissible.

To be sure, there is a principled way to avoid such results.  The original Establishment Clause only limited the federal government and was adopted at a time when state and local establishments were common.  The standard route to incorporation of most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights is a problematic basis for incorporating the Establishment Clause against the states because anti-Establishment is a structural principle, not a protection for individual rights of the sort protected by the Due Process Clause or the Privileges or Immunities Clause.  Accordingly, there is a good originalist argument for saying that the Establishment Clause doesn't apply to state and local governments.  But such a holding should be rejected on three grounds: 1) Stare decisis; 2) the originalist argument here relies on the now-mostly-disfavord expectations version of originalism rather than semantic originalism; and 3) it would be crazy and harmful to say that the Establishment Clause imposes no limits on state government, as that would allow such things as clearly sectarian organized prayer in public schools and even permit states to adopt Catholicism or Mormonism or Sunni Islam or whatever as the official state religion to be supported through taxation.

Without a principled means of avoiding the conclusion that the Establishment Clause bars all religious assertions by government, the Court could try to enforce that principle, but it does not do so, and for a good--if not exactly a principled--reason: The Justices understand that the American people would not accept a full-throated interpretation of the Establishment Clause.  Thus, to limit backlash, the Court has tried to avoid the implications of the Establishment Clause with a number of hand-waving distinctions.

For instance, various Justices have, at various points, dismissed real or hypothetical challenges to such things as the motto "In God We Trust" as mere "ceremonial Deism"--the fictive idea that invocations of a single God are meant only to solemnify rather than to assert any religious conception of the Divine. To see that this is bunk, imagine that you as a monotheist lived in a country with a clear polytheist majority where the official motto was "Blessed by All the gods" or "Fearful of the Wrath of the gods on Olympus".  Would you think that this was mere ceremonial polytheism?

Nonetheless, while ceremonial Deism is bunk, it is useful bunk, because it enables those Justices who invoke it to avoid either having to make dreadful substantive decisions (like saying the Establishment Clause doesn't limit the states) or to make correct principled decisions that will spark backlash among the large segment of the population who believe that there really is a war on Christmas.  Indeed, in many parts of the country, the American people do not even accept the watered down version of the Establishment Clause that the Court does acknowledge.

Another mechanism the Court uses to avoid the implications of the Establishment Clause is the "tradition exception," as articulated in Marsh v. Chambers.   There the Court rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to official legislative prayer on the grounds that it was part of an ongoing tradition dating to the Founding.  This too was bunk, because in other areas longstanding tradition is not necessarily enough to overcome compelling arguments for unconstitutionality.  To be sure, longstanding tradition could be relevant to an expectations originalist interpretation, but as noted above, the Court (quite sensibly) does not consistently apply expectations originalism in Establishment Clause jurisprudence or more generally.  Nonetheless, the tradition exception was useful in a case like Marsh because it meant that the Court could reject an Establishment Clause challenge without doing more widespread damage to its Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  The very dishonesty of the reasoning served to limit it.

The problem is that lies often beget more lies.  Steve asks Joan out for a drink; Joan likes Steve but finds him unattractive; to spare his feelings, she says she is too busy with work; Steve then runs into Joan, who is out on a date with Bill; Joan can admit that she wasn't too busy, just too busy for the likes of him, or she can lie some more, perhaps introducing Bill as her cousin who is unexpectedly visiting from out of town.

Likewise with the Court.  Having pretended in Marsh that tradition justifies legislative prayer, what does it do now, in Town of Greece v. Galloway, where the Court must answer the question of just how to interpret the scope of the tradition exception?  Does it apply to overtly sectarian prayer? If not, who decides whether a prayer is too sectarian and by what standards? Etc. Unless the Court "comes clean" and says that the tradition exception was always a pragmatic compromise, it cannot fashion a principled way of smoothing the boundary between the general doctrine and the unprincipled exception. Accordingly, I expect the Court to resolve the case by saying the jurisprudential equivalent of "it's not you, it's me."


Shag from Brookline said...

This is a black eye for the Second Circuit panel members. I'm curious as to how the "clarifying" opinion came about. Were just the panel members involved? Or did other Second Circuit judges "urge" the panel members to reconsider so that en banc review might be avoided with possible embarrassment by such review? And there is of course the question whether the panel members themselves ran afoul of Canon 2, taking into consideration the initial order and circumstances that might have led to the "clarifying" order. Perhaps the non-panel Second Circuit judges may be squirming a bit. Alas, there is no FOIA access to what might have happened.

Query: Does Judge Scheindlin have some sort of an "appeal" pending concerning her disqualification?

Michael C. Dorf said...

Bob Moss had difficulty posting his comment so he emailed it to me and asked me to post it for him. It states:

In my previous comment I surmised a connection between the Second Circuit panel’s action and the highly politicized, dishonest opinions regularly issuing from the Injustices of the Supreme Court, usually those labeled “right wing”. Now I’ve read the panel’s November 13 “opinion”, and I feel vindicated. It’s equally as appalling as anything I’ve read from Scalia’s, or any of his ilk’s, keyboard.

Just one example: the panel writes, “Further, in those two articles , as well as the New York Law Journal article, Judge Scheindlin describes herself as a jurist who is skeptical of law enforcement, in contrast to certain of her colleagues, whom she characterizes as inclined to favor the government.” At 12.

For the panel’s information, the word “skeptical” occurs ONCE in the New Yorker article: “But the city lawyers in the Floyd case are skeptical that the Judge’s mind is open.” It appears neither in the AP article nor in the law journal article. This is exactly the sort of lies Scalia and his ilk write into their opinions.

Lack of a hit for “skeptical” prompted me to do an eyeball search of the entire Law Journal article. I couldn’t find any statement from Scheindlin that’s even close to saying she’s skeptical of law enforcement. However, the article shed additional light on the antipathy held by the panel members toward Scheindlin. She has been a champion of Constitutional rights in the post-9/11 era, which would be more than enough to earn her the everlasting enmity of the invertebrate Federal judges who, cowering in fear of another terrorist attack, tossed our Constitution, along with Thomas “Sunshine Patriots” Paine, into the dustbin of history.

Shag from Brookline said...

Those who subscribe to the New York Law Journal may be interested in its "Retired Judges, Legal Ethics Profs Lobby for En Banc Review."

Paul.K said...

In my previous comment I surmised a connection between the Second Circuit panel’s action and the highly politicized, dishonest opinions regularly issuing from the Injustices of the Supreme Court, usually those labeled “right wing”. Now I’ve read the panel’s November 13 “opinion”, and I feel vindicated. It’s equally as appalling as anything I’ve read from Scalia’s, or any of his ilk’s, keyboard.Buy Fifa 14 Coins
LOL Boost

Unknown said...


Unknown said...


oakleyses said...

canada goose outlet, canada goose outlet, moncler, ghd, gucci, cheap sunglasses, mcm handbags, bottega veneta, ugg boots, cheap oakley sunglasses, soccer jerseys, oakley sunglasses cheap, herve leger, soccer shoes, marc jacobs, moncler, canada goose, cheap oakley sunglasses, cheap oakley sunglasses, babyliss pro, insanity, oakley sunglasses cheap, moncler outlet, tn pas cher, oakley, cheap sunglasses, jimmy choo, oakley outlet, chi flat iron, valentino shoes, ugg, uggs on sale, moncler, ugg boots, p90x, oakley vault, canada goose, oakley sunglasses outlet, louboutin, asics, oakley outlet, canada goose, ralph lauren, canada goose, oakley sunglasses outlet, celine handbags, ugg boots, ray ban, oakley vault

Unknown said...

Very awesome post , i am really impressed with it a lot

فوائد الزنجبيل

فوائد الرمان

فوائد الحلبة

فوائد البصل

فوائد الزعتر

فوائد زيت السمسم

علاج البواسير

فوائد اليانسون

فوائد الكركم

قصص جحا

صور يوم الجمعه

علامات الحمل

تعريف الحب

حياة البرزخ

فوائد الزبيب

Anonymous said...

These are things that you could not survive without. They include, of course, food, water and shelter. Even here, these should be at a minimum. Thanks. |

seoamine said...

thanks so much for that great blog and thanks also for accepting my links thanks
طريقة عمل الدونات طريقة عمل البان كيك طريقة عمل الكنافة طريقة عمل البسبوسة طريقة عمل الكيك طريقة عمل عجينة البيتزا فوائد القرفه

Unknown said...

thanks so much i like very so much your post
حلى الاوريو الفطر الهندي صور تورته حلى قهوه طريقة عمل السينابون طريقة عمل بلح الشام بيتزا هت كيكة الزبادي حلا سهل
صور كيك عجينة العشر دقائق

Anonymous said...

Good post but I was wondering if you could write a litte more on this subject? I’d be very thankful if you could elaborate a little bit further. Appreciate it! |