Wednesday, April 11, 2012

Was I As Sloppy As Jeff Toobin?

By Mike Dorf


Last week, The New Yorker published my letter to the editor criticizing Jeff Toobin for an earlier article in which Toobin in turn had criticized Judge Brett Kavanaugh for the latter's suggestion (in his dissent in the DC Circuit version of the health care litigation) that a President could, if he thought the minimum care provision of the Affordable Care Act was unconstitutional, simply choose not to enforce the Act--even if the courts were prepared to uphold it.  I wrote:
Jeffrey Toobin takes Judge Brett M. Kavanaugh to task for attributing to the President the power not to enforce a federal statute, even if the courts have upheld it (Comment, March 26th). Citing the 1803 landmark case of Marbury v. Madison, Toobin asserts categorically that this “is not how it works.” He thus overlooks a longstanding debate about the scope of judicial precedent. Thomas Jefferson declined to enforce the Sedition Act, on the ground that it violated the First Amendment, even though the courts were prepared to uphold the Act. Abraham Lincoln, in his first Inaugural Address, suggested that the Supreme Court’s infamous Dred Scott decision might not be binding beyond the parties to the case. And President Obama has declined to defend the Defense of Marriage Act, on the ground that it is discriminatory. Whatever one thinks of these and other assertions of Presidential non-enforcement power, Judge Kavanaugh did not invent the idea. I share Toobin’s view that the health-care law is valid, but I see no need to accuse a federal appeals-court judge of misunderstanding lessons that he learned in his first week of law school.

I have since received a number of emails questioning my historical examples, especially my reference to Jefferson.  Because the Sedition Act expired (just) before Jefferson took office, the emailers say, Jefferson had no occasion to "decline[] to enforce" it.  But he did.  Although the Sedition Act could not be used as the basis for prosecutions for conduct occurring once Jefferson took office, it expressly permitted the continuation of prosecutions for conduct taking place during the time when it was in force.  Jefferson found such a prosecution and ordered it dropped.  He also issued pardons to those people who had been convicted under the Sedition Act and were still serving sentences.



A couple of my email interlocutors persisted in the contention that granting pardons and dropping a pre-existing prosecution do not amount to declining to enforce.  Only the refusal to initiate new prosecutions, these emailers contended, would qualify as non-enforcement, and because the statute would not allow Jefferson to initiate any such new prosecutions for alleged sedition while he was in office, he really did have no occasion not to enforce the law.  With due respect, the emailers are using "enforce" in a highly idiosyncratic way.  Jefferson himself characterized his own actions in just the way that I did.  For example, in a July 1804 letter to Abigail Adams, Jefferson wrote:
I discharged every person under punishment or prosecution under the sedition law, because I considered, and now consider, that law to be a nullity, as absolute and as palpable as if Congress had ordered us to fall down and worship a golden image; and that it was as much my duty to arrest its execution in every stage, as it would have been to have rescued from the fiery furnace those who should have been cast into it for refusing to worship the image.
So it is clear that Jefferson regarded the pardons and the nolle prosequi as an exercise of his power not to execute, i.e., not to enforce, a law he deemed unconstitutional.  In short, I think I'm right and my email interlocutors are using the word "enforce" in an idiosyncratic way (to say the least).

One might also quibble with my other examples: Neither Lincoln nor Obama asserted a "non-enforcement" power in the examples I give.  But then, I offered them as instances of a "debate about the scope of judicial precedent."  Lincoln's statement clearly fits that description.  Meanwhile, the whole point of the Obama enforce-but-don't-defend strategy is to tee the issue up for the courts, even while the Administration takes the view that it need not argue every position that existing judicial precedent leaves open.  So that too, it seems to me, fits within my invocation of a debate about the scope of judicial precedent.  The only words I would change if I could are "these and other," since they suggest that all three examples were "assertions of Presidential non-enforcement power."  As the introductory information and description of the examples themselves make clear, I didn't intend them exactly that way.  I think the letter would have been better had it substituted "any particular" for "these and other."  But between the combination of my dashing the letter off so it would be timely and then having to approve edits for length, I didn't notice the implication.  So the critics--none of whom actually parsed the letter as closely as I just have--make a fair point about the wording on this point. 

Meanwhile, I think the underlying substantive issue is quite difficult, which is why my New Yorker letter merely says that Judge Kavanaugh did not invent the notion of executive non-enforcement.  I did not say what I thought the proper scope of the power should be.  The question is this: When may a President decline to enforce a law on grounds of unconstitutionality even though the courts would uphold, or have already upheld, the law?

It seems to me there are three possibilities, none of them entirely satisfactory: 1) Always; 2) Never; 3) Sometimes.

1) A very strong "departmentalist" view along the lines championed in recent years by Larry Kramer would emphasize that the President heads a co-equal branch of government.  In this view, the power to say what the law is that the Supreme Court asserted in Marbury is only a power to say what the law is in the context of contested cases, but does not bind other actors.  Congress and the President have prudential grounds for not enacting or enforcing laws that they know the courts will strike down, in the departmentalist view, but they do not have any principled or prudential grounds to subordinate their views about what the Constitution requires when those views are stricter than the views of the courts.

The chief problem with strong departmentalism is that in the name of asserting the President's co-equality with the courts, it arguably makes the President superior to Congress.  A President who happens to think a duly enacted law is invalid can choose to thwart the will of the majority that enacted the law--which may have been signed by a predecessor or enacted by a congressional super-majority over his own veto or perhaps even signed by this very President because of other provisions he liked, in which case his non-enforcement of a select provision is tantamount to an impermissible line-item veto.  Accordingly, the President's say-so alone is a problematic basis for the exercise of a non-enforcement power.

2) It may therefore be tempting to go all the way in the opposite direction and reject departmentalism entirely.  In this view, a President would have no power to non-enforce, except perhaps in circumstances in which he was anticipating that the courts would deem a law invalid.  Even then, the better course might be thought to adopt the Obama Administration's position on DOMA: Enforce but don't defend, so as to facilitate a justiciable case or controversy, and then if the courts definitively uphold the law, simply enforce it.    Perhaps even non-defense should be ruled out.  The most vigorous academic defense of the strongly judicial supremacist view was offered some years ago by Larry Alexander and Fred Schauer, who defend it principally on coordination grounds: The point of law, including the Constitution and constitutional law, they say, is to settle things, and treating the Supreme Court's interpretation of the law as definitive does a very good job of settling things.

The chief problem with the strongly judicial supremacist view is that the law is not only about settlement.  Constitutional law in particular is also about protecting certain substantive ideals and we can imagine circumstances in which the courts have abdicated their role in protecting those ideals.  Jefferson thought -- and history has judged that he was correct in thinking -- that the Federalist-packed judiciary was not doing its job by upholding the Sedition Act, which was a betrayal of a core ideal of constitutional liberty.  (For Jefferson himself, perhaps the underlying ideal was federalism rather than liberty, because, as his letter to Abigail Adams shows, he was comfortable with state sedition laws.  But put that aside.  History has vindicated Jefferson's free speech views on libertarian rather than federalism grounds.)  Should Jefferson have subordinated his view of the First Amendment to the views of the courts?  Suppose that World War II had dragged on for several more years and that Congress had enacted a law specifically authorizing mandatory evacuation of Japanese Americans from the West Coast.  Would it have been illegitimate for a President to choose not to enforce such a law on the ground that he thought it unconstitutional, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's contrary view in Korematsu?  The tendency of the Supreme Court from time to time to produce not just wrong, but disastrously wrong decisions, leads one to wonder whether some power of Presidential non-enforcement might not be vital as a safety valve.

3) Thus, it is tempting to reject both strong departmentalism and strong judicial supremacy in favor of some middle path in which the President can non-enforce a law that is blatantly or grossly unconstitutional, even though the courts disagree, but which rejects a power of non-enforcement whenever the President happens to disagree with the courts.

The chief problem with this intermediate view is its mushiness.  In what sense is a law blatantly or grossly unconstitutional if the courts, including perhaps the Supreme Court, have said or would say that it is in fact constitutional?  Any criteria a President uses to distinguish extreme cases from routine cases will likely be controversial, precisely because there will almost always be controversy around just those cases in which the President is tempted to use a non-enforcement power.  If we look to Presidents' assertions of a non-enforcement power, we typically find that they arise amidst very heated political contests.  The judgment of history rejects the Sedition Act and Korematsu, but the judgment of history does not come until long after the President faces the decision whether to non-enforce.

If I were writing a law review article or the like, I would now attempt to say which of the foregoing options I find best, all things considered, or perhaps I would offer some clever way out of the puzzle.  But I'm not writing a law review article on this subject, so I won't.  There is a substantial and growing body of academic literature that addresses the matter in substantially greater detail.  Interested readers can go look that up.

12 comments:

Sam Rickless said...

Presidents are elected. Even if they are in their second terms, they are always thinking about the political consequences of their decisions, the consequences for their party, for their future, for the future of like-minded politicians and big donors. They are more likely than SC to bend when a majority calls for the violation of the constitutional rights of a minority.

I have to go with Alexander and Schauer here, though perhaps not exactly for their reasons. The President should enforce the law as interpreted by SC, not because the policy of deferring to SC does a better job of settling constitutional matters, but because, procedurally and taking the long view, SC is more likely to do a better job than the President of guarding the very ideals that you think the President should sometimes overrule SC to protect. This is because SC is, relatively speaking, more insulated from political pressures (and from mob mentalities that periodically and predictably distort political decision-making) than the President is.

Of course, SC will make mistakes (Sedition Act, Dred Scott, Plessy, Gobitis, Korematsu -- and we could add Bowers, Heller, and others). But the President is far more likely to make mistakes than SC is, in large part because the President is mainly responding to political reality rather than to moral reality. Think of racial profiling, the run-up to the second Iraq War, the harassment of Muslim Americans after 9/11, HUAC, the Nixon debacle, executive order #9066, and so on. I'm going with the Supremes, even the terribly flawed SC majority we have right now. The alternative is tyranny of the one or of the many.

Publius the Clown said...

The departmentalist view of the President as a "co-equal" branch to the judiciary has to be limited, if not wrong, because no one contends that the President can continue to enforce a law that the Supreme Court has held unconstitutional.

On the other hand, when considering prosecutorial discretion, which (as I understand it) is effectively a sub-set of executive discretion, prosecutors routinely decline to prosecute not only specific instances of an alleged offense but also decline to prosecute some crimes entirely. (See, e.g., laws outlawing the digital transmission of legal pornography, which remain on the books but which no one enforces.)

Granted, prosecutorial discretion has nothing to do with determining the constitutionality of laws (or at least, it usually doesn't), but it suggests that everyone at least tacitly accepts that the executive branch has at least some latitude as to which laws to enforce.

So the middle position must be right, but what are its parameters? Maybe prosecutorial discretion is a special case that should be carved out from other forms of executive enforcement, and for the latter forms, the executive's discretion should be limited to how to enforce the law, not whether to enforce it.

I think I'm inclined to take this position. Otherwise, the entire lawmaking process becomes destabilized. If the President wants to veto a law, he can veto a law. If Congress overrides the veto, then the President's only recourse is the judiciary. To hold otherwise, and to maintain that the President can act on his own constitutional views, against Congress's views and without an authoritative statement from the courts, is to elevate the executive branch above both other branches.

Sure, one could counter that the Alien and Sedition Act and Japanese internment were bad things, but just because the people or the courts occasionally get things wrong doesn't mean that we should give one elected official that much power relative to all of the other elected or appointed officials in the other two branches.

Michael C. Dorf said...

Sam: The argument for a Presidential power of non-enforcement rests on the supposition that a President will simply not execute laws that violate rights the Court hasn't recognize; it doesn't assert a power to defy the courts. Your examples are not instances of Presidential non-enforcement. I'm not saying the Alexander/Schauer position is wrong but to make the case against it on civil libertarian grounds, you need to show how non-enforcement of laws the courts have upheld or would uphold undermines civil liberties. A good example might be Presidential non-enforcement of federal civil rights laws on grounds that such laws violate federalism, notwithstanding Supreme Court cases (like Katzenbach v. McClung and Heart of Atlanta) upholding them.

Michael C. Dorf said...

Correction to my comment: I meant to make the case FOR the Alexander/Schauer position on civil libertarian grounds one needs something like the example I gave, not to make the case AGAINST their position.

Sam Rickless said...

Michael: Thanks for clarifying. I was definitely confused in the way you suggest. Also, and importantly, I wasn't paying much attention to the distinction between the decision not to enforce a law that *violates* rights and the decision not to enforce a law that *protects* rights. But this is not surprising. The power of non-enforcement is a double-edged sword. It can just as easily happen that a President decides not to enforce a law that (as it happens) *protects* rights as it is that a President decides not to enforce a law that (as it happens) *violates* rights. So a Presidential power of non-enforcement *can* function as a safety valve, but it can also function in the opposite way. As you say, the President could decline to enforce civil rights laws, which would be a disaster. An example of something related to this would be a "pro-life" President refusing to enforce a law protecting women from harassment (and worse) at Planned Parenthood clinics.

If SC says that a duly enacted law is constitutional (and, in particular, does not violate any person's rights under the Constitution), then it is not the President's place to choose not to enforce it (whatever her reasons for doing so).

AF said...

"no one contends that the President can continue to enforce a law that the Supreme Court has held unconstitutional"

Actually, I believe that a departmentalist would say that the President can continue to enforce a law that the Supreme Court has held unconstitutional, unless under an injunction or court order not to. But as Professor Dorf says, there are "prudential grounds" for not doing so, namely that anyone aggrieved by the enforcement can sue and likely win.

Publius the Clown said...

@AF: Interesting possibility. But would that be true even if the President, or the United States, was a party in the case that held the law unconstitutional? If either was a party, wouldn't violating the Court's order constitute contempt?

Rose Warissa said...

I have to go with Alexander and Schauer here, though perhaps not exactly for their factors. The Chief executive should use the law as viewed by SC, not because the plan of deferring to SC does a better job of deciding constitutional issues, but because, procedurally and getting the lengthy perspective, SC is more likely to do a better job than the Chief executive of preserving the very beliefs that you think the Chief executive should sometimes overrule SC to secure. This is because SC is, relatively discussing, more protected from governmental demands (and from mob mentalities that regularly and naturally change governmental decision-making) than the Chief executive is.Buy Cheap Windows 7 professional Key
Buy Cheap Windows 7 professional product Key
Buy Cheap Windows 7 professional activation Key

love game said...

A good example might be Presidential non-enforcementCheap WOW Gold of federal municipal rights regulations on reasons that such regulations breach federalism, despite BetterCheap Runescape Gold Court cases (like Katzenbach v. McClung and Heart of Atlanta) maintaining them.

Susi Jayanti said...

Berita jokowi capres
Kabar berita capres 2014
Berita pilpres indonesia 2014
Berita prabowo subianto
Berita jadwal debat capres jokowi prabowo 2014
Berita partai pks
Berita survey pemilu capres 2014
Berita capres cawapres jokowi jk
Berita pemilu indonesia 2014
Berita partai pkb

Coach Factory said...

ray ban pas cher, beats by dre, mulberry, hollister, supra shoes, longchamp, wedding dresses, nfl jerseys, louis vuitton, lululemon, instyler ionic styler, north face jackets, roshe run, louis vuitton, mac cosmetics, giuseppe zanotti, mont blanc, ralph lauren, montre pas cher, louboutin, nike roshe, ralph lauren, rolex watches, reebok outlet, juicy couture outlet, abercrombie and fitch, hermes, hollister, oakley pas cher, nike huarache, burberry, birkin bag, karen millen, lancel, abercrombie and fitch, nike free, yoga pants, nike trainers, new balance shoes, louis vuitton, juicy couture outlet, ferragamo shoes, michael kors, air max, hogan, converse shoes, nike air max, vans, timberland, north face outlet

Coach Factory said...

canada goose outlet, canada goose outlet, moncler, ghd, gucci, cheap sunglasses, mcm handbags, bottega veneta, ugg boots, cheap oakley sunglasses, soccer jerseys, oakley sunglasses cheap, herve leger, soccer shoes, marc jacobs, moncler, canada goose, cheap oakley sunglasses, cheap oakley sunglasses, babyliss pro, insanity, oakley sunglasses cheap, moncler outlet, tn pas cher, oakley, cheap sunglasses, jimmy choo, oakley outlet, chi flat iron, valentino shoes, ugg, uggs on sale, moncler, ugg boots, p90x, oakley vault, canada goose, oakley sunglasses outlet, louboutin, asics, oakley outlet, canada goose, ralph lauren, canada goose, oakley sunglasses outlet, celine handbags, ugg boots, ray ban, oakley vault