Sunday, July 15, 2007

We Need Instant Runoff Voting

Now that Ralph Nader is once again contemplating running for President, surely the statute of limitations has run on respect for the man's past work as a consumer safety crusader. He has clearly devolved into egomania. Indeed, it seems unlikely that Nader would have any effect on the 2008 election, unless we have a replay of 2000, with the vote in a decisive state so close that a tiny percentage of "spoiler" votes is able to turn the tide. But Democrats---and depending on the Republican nominee, perhaps Republicans---have much more to fear from a Bloomberg candidacy, both because of his ability to spend huge sums of his own money and because he won't be dismissed as a fringe candidate.

The obvious solution is "instant runoff voting," (IRV), in which voters rank their choices for candidates. That way, if in some state, say, the Republican candidate gets 45% of the vote, the Democrat gets 44% of the vote, and the remaining candidates get 11% of the vote, the votes of ballots that gave first place to those 11% are redistributed to their second choice (or if neither of the two major candidates is second, then third, fourth, etc), so that the ultimate winner actually is the choice of the electorate in a head-to-head race between the two most popular candidates. Various U.S. jurisdictions already use IRV, as do many other countries, and unlike some other reforms, there is a decent chance that the major parties could get behind it, because it virtually eliminates the spoiler problem (and there's no reason why spoilers are more likely, a priori, to hurt Dems more than Repubs or vice-versa). To be sure, IRV helps third-party candidates because it allows voters to rank a third-party candidate first without worrying that she is wasting her vote, and for that reason, would help third parties to build support over time. So from the perspective of the major parties, IRV is at best a mixed bag.

Even with IRV, a third-party candidate can still play the role of spoiler by winning one state, and IRV makes it somewhat MORE likely that a third-party candidate would throw the election into the House of Representatives. As noted above, IRV lowers the cost of voting for third-party candidates, so a very strong one (like Bloomberg) could conceivably win a state or two, leaving no candidate with a majority of electoral votes. But that defect is probably best laid at the door of the Electoral College, for which the cure is either a constitutional amendment or the intriguing idea of a national popular vote interstate compact.

Alas, we're probably already too far into the 2008 campaign for these inherently non-partisan reforms to be adopted, because the parties and the candidates will ask whether they will benefit in the next election. But if timed properly, perhaps these ideas could get some traction, especially if there's anything resembling a replay of 2000.

20 comments:

BROKEN LADDER said...

This post unfortunately repeats common myths about IRV. The truth is that better and simpler methods than IRV exist - and IRV is lethal to third parties, because voting for a non-major-party candidate is statistically more likely to hurt you than help you. The world needs Range Voting or its simplified form of Approval Voting. Here's why.

Consider this hypothetical election using IRV.

#voters their vote
10 G > C > P > M
3 C > G > P > M
5 C > P > M > G
6 M > P > C > G
4 P > M > C > G

C is the clear Condorcet (condor-SAY) winner, meaning he is preferred by a landslide majority over all his individual rivals. C is preferred over G, P, and M all by an 18-10 margin.

But... M wins, even though he also has fewer first-place votes (6 voters) than C with 8.
Also:

1. P is preferred to M by 22 of the 28 voters, yet he's the first candidate eliminated.
2. G also has more first-place votes (10) than M's 6.
3. So M either loses pairwise to, or has fewer first-place votes than (or both) every rival, but still IRV elects M.

The example above was intended to be "realistic," perhaps somewhat resembling the situation in the (now evolving) 2008 US presidential race with G="Green", M=McCain, C=Edwards, and P=Paul. But if you are willing to drop realism and construct artificial election scenarios, then this demonstrates how to construct arbitrarily-severe election examples of this kind: http://rangevoting.org/IRVamp.html#bad

IRV sounds initially appealing, because people picture a weak third party candidate who loses in the first round. The myth is that this takes away the fear of voting for your sincere favorite candidate, and gives third parties a fair chance to grow; but if that candidate or his party ever grows to be a contender, he is statistically more likely to hurt the party closest to his own than to win. It doesn't matter how unlikely you imagine the above scenario to be - it's still _more_ likely than the odds "Green" will win. And so third party voters will learn to strategically vote for their favorite major-party candidate, because it will more often be a good strategy than a bad one. You don't have to buy my math; you can look at decades of IRV usage in Australia's house, and Ireland's presidency. Both use IRV, and have been two-party dominated. So much for the myths that IRV allows you to "vote your hopes, not your fears", and eliminates spoilers. Now we know why the Libertarian Reform Caucus calls IRV a "bullet in the foot" for third parties, and why Australian political analysts at AustralianPolitics.com say that IRV "promotes a two-party system to the detriment of minor parties and independents."

Electoral reform advocates (especially third parties!) should be demanding Range Voting - score all the candidates and elect the one with the highest average. Its simplified form, Approval Voting, is probably the most feasible to implement. It simply uses ordinary ballots, but allows us to vote for as many candidates as we like. Consider the benefits:

* More resistant to strategy: As we see above, IRV strategically "forces" voters not to top-rank their sincere favorite; the general strategy with IRV is to top-rank your favorite of the front-runners (typically the major party candidates). But with Range Voting and Approval Voting, this _never_ happens. The worst a voter may do is exaggerate his sincere scores to the max and min scores allowed. But with Range Voting, a for your favorite candidate can never hurt you, or the candidate, whereas with IRV it can hurt both. http://RangeVoting.org/StratHonMix.html

* The previous fact explains why IRV leads to two-party duopoly, just like plurality voting. http://RangeVoting.org/TarrIrv.html

* Spoiler free: Whereas IRV merely _reduces_ spoilers. http://rangevoting.org/FBCexecSumm.html

* Simpler to use and implement: A simple one-round summation tells us the results, whereas IRV's potential for multiple rounds can cause long delays before the final results are determined. A side-effect of Range Voting's simplicity is that it makes the necessary transition away from voting machines more feasible. IRV's complexity leads most communities implementing it to purchase expensive and fraud-conducive (electronic!) voting machines, the fraudster's best friend. http://RangeVoting.org/Complexity.html

* Decreases spoiled ballots: Since voting for more than one candidate is permissible, the number of invalid ballots experimentally goes down with Range and Approval Voting. But here in San Francisco, we saw a seven fold increase in spoiled ballots when we started using IRV. http://rangevoting.org/SPRates.html

* Greater voter satisfaction: Using extensive computer modeling of elections, a Princeton math Ph.D. named Warren D. Smith has shown that these methods lead to better average satisfaction with election results, surpassing the alternatives by a good margin. But IRV turns out to be the second _worst_ of the commonly proposed alternatives. This mean that all voters will benefit from the adoption of either of these superior voting methods, regardless of political stripe. http://RangeVoting.org/vsi.html

* Reduces the probability of ties: While they are not extremely common, they do happen. IRV statistically increases them, but Range Voting decreases them. http://RangeVoting.org/TieRisk.html

* In case you're going to say, "But IRV has more _momentum_ than Range Voting", you should consider this. http://RangeVoting.org/IRVsplitExec.html

Get the facts at RangeVoting.org and ApprovalVoting.org

And if you're in the market for a better system of proportional representation (http://RangeVoting.org/PropRep.html) than the antiquated STV system, check out Reweighted Range Voting and Asset Voting.

http://RangeVoting.org/RRV.html
http://RangeVoting.org/Asset.html

Clay Shentrup
San Francisco, CA
415.240.1973
thebrokenladder@gmail.com

BROKEN LADDER said...

To be sure, IRV helps third-party candidates because it allows voters to rank a third-party candidate first without worrying that she is wasting her vote, and for that reason, would help third parties to build support over time.

Nope. Australia has used IRV in their House of Representatives since 1918. Out of 564 IRV seats, precisely 1 of them is held by a third party. That's a 0.18% third party rate, whereas the U.S. is 0.09% in all federal and state seats combined. Their Senate, on the other hand, uses proportional representation, and so has 9 third party candidates. Yet in spite of that viability, third parties still can't make a dent in IRV races.

Ireland has used IRV in their Presidential election since 1938. The Fianna Fail has won that race every single time since then, except for one very fluky exception - so it's been closer to a monopoly than a duopoly. And the position isn't even very important (mostly ceremonial), and so there's not much incentive for strategic voting...and Ireland has proportional representation in their Dail (meaning more than two parties), yet they still can't break duopoly in their IRV post.

Malta and Fiji also both used IRV for some time, and also had the same experience. Yet IRV supporters typically like to ignore reality, and point to a handful of examples where third parties won with IRV, particularly when it had been newly implemented, and people didn't know how to game the system yet. There is unfortunately an enormous amount of misinformation in circulation about IRV, leading third parties (e.g. Greens) to suicidally support it, instead of Range Voting (which would also help them get proportional representation, by breaking up duopoly).

Here's a look at how like FairVote and the League of Women Voters have made glaring false claims about IRV.
http://RangeVoting.org/Irvtalk.html

Michael C. Dorf said...

I am obviously not as devoted to this subject as "broken ladder," and I have no commitment to IRV over range voting or any of a number of other alternatives to plurality-winner-takes-all systems. But IRV does strike me as a clear improvement over the status quo. IRV is somewhat simpler than range voting, although voters come to understand any system after it is used a few times. See
http://rangevoting.org/Complexity.html

No system eliminates Condorcet problems, both because there is no perfect or "neutral" way to aggregate preferences and because individual preferences are subject to framing effects, etc. But to repeat, my main point was to criticize the status quo, a point also made in the opening lines of the Range Voting website homepage.

Benjam said...

broken ladder: nice post. cycling was the first thing that came to mind when i read the diary, but i didnt have the stamina on a sunday. i'm glad someone did.

technically speaking, cycling doesnt happen under the status quo system because everyone only gets one vote and the plurality winner takes all. another problem with IRV is the idea that it requires software and more "black box" voting.

mike is correct, however, that no electoral system is perfect at distilling voter preferences, especially when we add to the mix a voter's intensity of preference.

i think electoral reform is absolutely needed to address: (1) potential conflicts between the electoral college and the popular vote; (2) political or race-based gerrymanders; and (3) the duopoloy created by single-member-district representation in the House.

mike is unfortunately also correct that most voting reform is politcally impossible. the idea of an interstate compact is the best approach to the electoral college "problem" but i wonder if there are constitutional questions about that approach. is there anything analagous?

Michael C. Dorf said...

Ben raises a good question about the interstate compact. Most of its proponents say that it would be enforceable by the courts, but I'm not so sure that the Supreme Court wouldn't say that it's invalid as an end-run around Article 2 and the 12th Amendment. (That's more or less what the Court said in Clinton v. New York w/r/t the Line Item Veto Act, even though, as Scalia and Breyer explained in dissent, the Act's main flaw was that it appeared to circumvent the Article I, Sec 7 mechanism, without actually violating it.)
But even if the courts would not enforce a compact, the states might abide by it anyway, so it may be worth pursuing nonetheless.

Benjam said...

i suppose that a presidential candidate who lost the popular vote but stood to win the electoral college (but for an interstate compact) could sue the states that would be "redirecting" their electoral votes. it certainly is hard to imagine the court getting involved with that, but if they did so, it would propbably be along the lines of Clinton v NYC and INS v. Chada. in retrospect, few of us thought the court would take up the EP claims made in Bush v. Gore.

it seems to me that the court doesnt see itself merely as the final authority on matters of law, but rather as the institution best positioned to mediate social, economic, and political conflicts. as such, the court is likely to insert itself wherever there appears to be a need for a "final" ruling.

what about unfaithful electors? what if the partisans sent by florida in 2000 to serve as electors had drank the kool-aid and decided to cast their ballots for Gore? would the court have intervened? it is hard to imagine they would not have intervened but it is hard to imagine a legitimate basis for such an intervention.

i guess the last point is that the electoral collge is not defective simply because it can produce a result like in 2000. this was the counter-majoritarian compromise made during the framing. states have power qua states. the inclination to abolish the electoral college should in equal measure advocate for states to have proportional representation in the senate. i'm not saying either change would amount to bad policy, but both institutions are important residuals of the federalist tradition.

BROKEN LADDER said...

IRV is somewhat simpler than range voting

No, it is substantially more complex, in an objective sense. I described this in detail in my post. The difference can be made especially clear if we vote for a longer list of candidates.

No system eliminates Condorcet problems

Range Voting does, because it isn't based on the flawed notion of majoritarianism, but instead utility efficiency.

http://RangeVoting.org/ArrowThm.html

there is no perfect or "neutral" way to aggregate preferences

Incorrect. The "perfect" way is to pick the candidate who makes the most people the most happy. That is, the one who maximizes the sum of the voters' individual utilities. Since we can't read voters' minds, we can't do this perfectly, but the social utility efficiency of Range Voting is impressively superior to that of IRV, making it objectively better. Again, I discussed this in my post. Here's a page that discusses why the social utility function must be additive:
http://RangeVoting.org/UtilFoundns.html

and because individual preferences are subject to framing effects, etc.

I have no idea what you mean by this.

But to repeat, my main point was to criticize the status quo

But you did make substantial (and mainly false) claims in favor of IRV, which is a tiny improvement over the status quo, and has downsides (like increasing the number of spoiled ballots, preventing further - much better - reforms, and increasing reliance on electronic voting machines, making fraud easier).

Therefore, taking all these effects into account, I suggest that IRV is worse than our current system.

egarber said...

i suppose that a presidential candidate who lost the popular vote but stood to win the electoral college (but for an interstate compact) could sue the states that would be "redirecting" their electoral votes.

A few questions for anybody:

Isn't the interstate compact just another possible way a state legislature can "appoint" electors?

Or put another way, if a state can obligate electors via law to vote for the majority winner within that state (I think many states have such rules), what is materially different about that same legislature declaring that the votes go with the national majority?

But you guys are correct, in that nobody thought the Supreme Court would consider itself the arbiter between branches within a sovereign state. But it did nonetheless in Bush v. Gore, defending Fla's state legislature against the state's own Supreme Court.

BROKEN LADDER said...

technically speaking, cycling doesn't happen under the status quo system because everyone only gets one vote and the plurality winner takes all.

On the contrary, it happens under all ordinal voting methods. Cycling is about preference order, regardless of whether the voting system allows voters to express it. If a Condorcet cycle exists between A, B, and C, then plurality voting would elect A against B (if just those two ran), and B over C...but would elect C against A, contradicting its own idea of "best winner". No rank-order voting system can escape this.

another problem with IRV is the idea that it requires software and more "black box" voting.

Wrong. Aussies used IRV, and the much more complicated STV with reweighting, with hand-counted paper ballots (and telegraphing rounds into a central tabulator) for decades, before "software" existed. But yes, IRV is more conducive to the use of (electronic!) voting machines, which are a reprehensible idea if you don't like massive election fraud.

mike is correct, however, that no electoral system is perfect at distilling voter preferences especially when we add to the mix a voter's intensity of preference.

Actually, you're wrong. CTT voting, invented by economists, is "perfect" because it uses revealed preference. Voters place "bids" on candidates, such that lying is economically disadvantageous.
http://RangeVoting.org/CTT.html

The problem is, voting with money is pretty much infeasible, even if perfect at measuring voter preferences. Range Voting doesn't have a 100% social utility efficiency, but it comes very very close - it beats essentially all of the 60 or so other methods it was tested against.

i think electoral reform is absolutely needed to address: (1) potential conflicts between the electoral college and the popular vote;

Although the current phrasing of the NPV legislation is headed for a trainwreck (without our help).
http://rangevoting.org/NPVtrainwreck.html

(2) political or race-based gerrymanders;

We have a way to stop Gerrymandering dead in its tracks, if only people like Common Cause will wake up and realize that their "independent redistricting commissions" idea is ludicrous and unrealistic, and that they must support our math-based "unriggable" method.

http://rangevoting.org/GerryExamples.html

(3) the duopoly created by single-member-district representation in the House.

Duopoly isn't caused by single-member districts, per se. For instance, most of the 27 countries that use a genuine runoff election (not instant runoff) have escaped duopoly in their single-winner races). Most non-proportional methods achieve duopoly because it statistically hurts a voter to vote for anyone other than his favorite of the two clear front-runners (typically the two major party candidates). But Range Voting takes away the favorite betrayal incentive, and so can destroy duopoly.

And if you want to change the laws that are massively stacked against proportional representation, you're going to have a hard time doing it in a country that is two-party dominated. So you first have to implement Range Voting, to break up duopoly, and elect leaders who will want to work to get PR. Otherwise PR is just going to happen in a handful of (extremely progressive) areas, like Minneapolis (which now uses STV!). But of course, Reweighted Range Voting and Asset Voting are better than STV.
http://RangeVoting.org/PropRep.html

mike is unfortunately also correct that most voting reform is politically impossible.

Nonsense. Several municipalities have gotten IRV in the past year, even though it's a horrible system. So there's no reason that reformers can't successfully push for the simpler and better Range/Approval voting, once properly educated about IRV's tremendous failings.

the idea of an interstate compact is the best approach to the electoral college "problem" but i wonder if there are constitutional questions about that approach. is there anything analogous?

In a sense there are such problems, because states are forbidden from making interstate compacts, or something to that effect. But I think they can get by because the NPV legislation doesn't require them to promise anything to each other. All they are saying is, "Hey folks, our electoral votes go to the NPV winner." That's not really a compact with other states, it's just an open promise.

i suppose that a presidential candidate who lost the popular vote but stood to win the electoral college (but for an interstate compact) could sue the states that would be "redirecting" their electoral votes.

Ludicrous. States are allowed to assign their electoral votes however they want to (I'm pretty sure). They could, for instance, give them out in proportion to the vote totals.

i guess the last point is that the electoral college is not defective simply because it can produce a result like in 2000. this was the counter-majoritarian compromise made during the framing. states have power qua states. the inclination to abolish the electoral college should in equal measure advocate for states to have proportional representation in the senate.

You can't have PR in the senate, because senators are elected in staggered terms.

Benjam said...

broken ladder:

On the contrary, it happens under all ordinal voting methods. Cycling is about preference order, regardless of whether the voting system allows voters to express it. If a Condorcet cycle exists between A, B, and C, then plurality voting would elect A against B (if just those two ran), and B over C...but would elect C against A, contradicting its own idea of "best winner". No rank-order voting system can escape this.

I must need to disagree with you. All the candidates run at once and there is a plurality winner. There is only one vote with all candidates in the field. No cycling takes place.

You can't have PR in the senate, because senators are elected in staggered terms.

wow, really? you act like you're talking to a bunch of kids in middle school rather than to people with advanced degrees in the field. i was making a point about the US constitutional structure in light of historical facts. i was talking about proportional representation in terms of allocating congressional representation based on a state's population. the simple point i was making is that the same historical forces which led to the adoption of the couter-majoritarian nature of the senate are embedded in the electoral college so that if you oppose the electoral college you should also oppose the fact that every state gets two senators irrespective of population.

Ludicrous. States are allowed to assign their electoral votes however they want to (I'm pretty sure). They could, for instance, give them out in proportion to the vote totals.

here again you dont bother to absorb the nuance of the discussion. this was not a normative comment on range voting but rather constitutional law discussion about standing, justiciability and textualism.

In a sense there are such problems, because states are forbidden from making interstate compacts, or something to that effect. But I think they can get by because the NPV legislation doesn't require them to promise anything to each other. All they are saying is, "Hey folks, our electoral votes go to the NPV winner." That's not really a compact with other states, it's just an open promise.

if you werent so focused on telling people they were wrong, you might learn something. that would probably eliminate this sort of nonsense. i greatly appreciate the knowledge and passion you bring to the subject of voting, but there are other issues being discussed here which clearly escape your expertise. your original post was excellent. thanks for that.

BROKEN LADDER said...

I must need to disagree with you. All the candidates run at once and there is a plurality winner. There is only one vote with all candidates in the field. No cycling takes place.

I must need to mathematically prove you wrong. Consider this scenario:

% of voters their preference
35% A > B > C
33% B > C > A
32% C > A > B

Candidate A wins a plurality election if everyone votes for his favorite candidate. But there's still a Condorcet cycle, meaning that if B had not run, C would beat A - showing that this example fails independence of irrelevant alternatives, which is one of the basic points of Condorcet cycles.

So nevermind what you agree with. Here's proof that Condorcet cycles are just as relevant in plurality voting as with any other ordinal voting method.

i was talking about proportional representation in terms of allocating congressional representation based on a state's population.

Well, you raise a good point. But in that case, why even have a "senate"? Why not just have one big unicameral legislature (with PR)? Or why not just have the same number of reps per state, but give their votes a weighting that corresponds to their states' populations?

You might be interested in the mathematics of apportionment.

http://rangevoting.org/Apportion.html

Benjam said...

broken ladder:

If your definition of a cycle is any election that has no Condorcet winner, then cycling does occur in this case. My use of the term "cycling" relates to repeated votes in parliamentary amendment procedure. No reason to quibble over definitions-- i will readily admit that the current plurality system can fail to produce a condorcet winner when more than two candidates compete.

With respect to Arrow's theorem, which of the 5 conditions does range voting violate?

Your question, "Why have the Senate?" is correct from a standpoint of social choice theory. The answer to the question was given around 230 years ago:

The framers created a senate so that the less populous states would agree to ratify the constitution. It was part of a "grand compromise" intended to incentivize both small and large states to relinguish a portion of their sovereignty and join the union. The Senate isnt counter-majoritarian by accident, but rather by design. It reflects the fact that the framers' primary concern was not to create efficiency but rather to impede the concentration of governmental power.

interesting link on the issue of rounding in apportionment schemes.

Harald Korneliussen said...

Range voting is severely vulnerable to tactical voting, even in cases where you have _no_ information whatsoever on what other voters think. And if you do have info, your best strategy is still to find the two front-runners, null the one and max the other. Vote honestly for the rest.

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