Tuesday, November 18, 2008

Monkeys Typing

Last Friday's panel on Demystifying Legal Reasoning, by Larry Alexander and Emily Sherwin, about which I posted earlier, was a rollicking good time for all. While all of us commentators had lavish praise for the book, we all also took issue with, among other things, the authors' commitment to speaker's meaning (with Heidi Hurd delivering the most forceful critique on this point). Here I want to pile on.

Proponents of speaker's meaning (including Alexander and Sherwin) are fond of examples of what appear to be comprehensible statements produced mindlessly: a cloud formation that forms the letters C-A-T; the outline of Alfred Hitchcock produced accidentally by the wandering of an insect on the sand; and nearly everyone's favorite, a complete English language sentence (or all the works of Shakespeare) produced by monkeys randomly pounding the keys of typewriters. Intentionalists say that none of these occurrences has any meaning, because none was intended to communicate anything.

This seems self-evidently wrong. Suppose I am staring out the window of my office, trying to remember the name of a particular student. I look up at the sky and see clouds forming the letters T-O-M. "Eureka," I say to myself. "The student's name is Tom." One need not think that God has sent me a message to see that there was not just meaning in the cloud formation, but useful meaning in it, at least for me.

At this point, the intentionalist will typically object that I have supplied the meaning, but this too seems wrong, or at least incomplete. Suppose another student were in my office and, in answer to the question, "Who was your classmate who made that interesting point about the unitary Exeuctive in class today?", the student volunteered, "that was Tom." So far as I'm concerned, my comprehension of the phrase "that was Tom" supplies meaning in just the same way that the cloud letters "T-O-M" in the sky do. In each case, I must decode (spoken or written) English to produce meaning.

Intentionalists are undoubtedly smart enough to realize all of this, and so we are left with the puzzle of how it is that they can think, as Stanley Fish says, that "apart from intention . . . words don't mean anything." In my example, the cloud "T-O-M" obviously did mean something to me, even though I wasn't searching for anybody's intention.

At this point, one is tempted to say that what we have here is a semantic disagreement. Intentionalists want to preserve the word "meaning" for speaker's meaning, whereas people who believe in utterance meaning (and other conceptions of meaning) have a broader view. It's sometimes exasperating to argue with the intentionalists on whether we are using the concept of meaning correctly, but let's concede the point, and use the word "shmeaning" to refer to the broader category, which includes messages attributed by readers even if not intended by the actual author, and even if no message was intended by any author (or speaker).

Then, it seems, the disagreement over whether to adopt speaker's meaning (what the intentionalists would simply call "meaning") or some other account of shmeaning, can be recast as a debate over whose understandings should count in various enterprises. If the enterprise is "being reminded of people's names," then there is no good reason to prefer speaker's meaning to reader's shmeaning because reader's shmeaning can--albeit rarely--remind one of a name, even absent a speaker.

So suppose the enterprise is "figuring out what the law is." The intentionalist move now is to say something like "figuring out what the law is consists, at least in the first instance, of interpretation, and one can only interpret by retrieving speaker's meaning." But this cannot be a claim about language, for as the cloud example shows, there are reasons to prefer reader's shmeaning to speaker's meaning in some contexts. And so the intentionalist must give a reason peculiar to law why speaker's meaning should be preferred. Claims that speaker's meaning is simply the only shmeaning won't cut it.

Might the intentionalist slightly modify his account to say that it holds wherever we are looking for the meaning or shmeaning of an intentionally created text? Clearly not. Suppose that instead of seeing the cloud formation, I looked at my desk and saw a letter signed "T.O.M.," initials used by a friend named Tanya Olivia McDonald. Tanya didn't intend to convey the (sh)meaning "Tom," and I know that fact. Nonetheless, I derive a valuable shmeaning--the name of the student who made the point about the unitary Executive--from what Tanya wrote, even though it was not what she intended.

One can, of course, marshall decent reasons why there are legitimacy problems with courts inferring unintended (sh)meanings from authoritative texts. But those are reasons rooted in normative political theory, not a theory of language. And so, it appears that intentionalism is, at bottom, an attempt to disguise a (not wholly unattractive) normative political theory as an account--indeed, as the only possible account--of language.

Posted by Mike Dorf


A. said...

More important, this intentionalist account misapprehends the nature of legislative commands. (Perhaps a different story can be told regarding executive orders and similar commands to direct (internal) subordinates, but legislative pronouncements are generalized commands to a general republic.) Legislative pronouncements are a social code, arising from and representing shared public assumptions and values. And both for normative and practical reasons, these pronouncements mean what the objects of the code understand them to mean (as mediated by those to whom we delegate interpretive authority). To say that a legislative pronouncement means what a misguided author thought it should have meant is like saying that a line of computer code means what the college freshman meant it to mean. In fact, however, its "meaning" can be found only in its relationship with other lines of code and the objects of those commands. The misguided freshman still gets points off his lab course if the code doesn't "run." The strongest version of my account might be too strong and almost meaningless, of course, but certainly the search for legislative "meaning" must involve resort to common, shared understandings of the objects of regulation. Additionally, this view might seem more normatively attractive to the extent that we want legislators held accountable for the laws they enact, and to the extent that we respect the process of bicameralism and presentment.

Caleb said...

I wonder if the shmeaning you refer to in the Tom examples isn't something we could talk about being communicated by the "text" you read rather than something that was purely internal.

Suppose you heard a sound like "Glom" (right now I can't think of anything that would make such a sound, but for the purposes of this example, perhaps a pile of law students' papers "glommed" down the stairs). The noise might be close enough to "Tom" to trigger your memory of the name, but that would be internally supplied meaning--after all, perhaps you hear papers glom down the stairs all the time, but this time you were trying to remember Tom's name, and the sound had meaning.

If that's the case, then it seems to me that there's a meaningful difference between the cloud example and the others-- you supplied the meaning to an external stimulus. The tougher cases are the ones like "T.O.M."--however, my impulse would be to say that as you looked at it, it might remind you of Tom's name, but it would be clear to you that it was purposive communication for a purpose other than reminding you of Tom's name. In which case, you might assign some internal meaning to the initials, but I don't think you could claim that the "speaker's" meaning was to convey that meaning--it was something entirely separate and internal.

Which, to me, would suggest that the internal meaning is not "communication" in the same way as a piece of legislation or a speech. If her name was Geraldine Olivia Prudence, she might recognize that she was going to communicate something different than she intended by carving her initials, but her meaning would be something that was there because she intended it--it could be mediated by a relationship with the intended recipient (American/Non-American might matter in this case), but the communicated meaning would matter because she intended to communicate something.

Perhaps I've trailed off into irrelevance, but what I'm trying to say is that, while I agree that "intentionalism" is not required, I don't know that you could have "communication" of meaning without purpose, and, if there is a purpose, it is a valid difference from random events which trigger memories.

egarber said...

So prof,

When you're grading exams, do you ever cut a student some slack because you know what she meant, even if some of the nuts and bolts are wrong?

And if so, wouldn't that be a fairly extreme example of reading through the language to intent?

Not sure where I'm going with this, but I'll leave the question out there.

A. said...

Different questions produce different methodologies for answer searches. The output on an exam is to some degree a mere proxy for the real pedagogical goal. I.e., the question is : "what have you learned; what can you do in this field of study going forward?" The answer to this question, the "meaning," is informed by the inchoate and implied answers lurking in the output. The output of a law is mediated coercion. The search for "meaning," therefore, is what does this law require of us? What are my rights and obligations? What will an officer of the law do to me if I do x,y,z to place this law at issue? The search for this meaning seems to me to have nothing to do with exploring the psychology of an individual law giver, even were such a person to exist.

Maybe I'm just talking past the issues of interpretation and moving too quickly to the different question of legal legitimacy. Maybe I'm betraying a clouding, reductionist uber-pragmatism, but I just can't understand how questions of interpretation of LAWS (and authoritative interpretations thereof) can even be raised without first considering the context.

Tam Ho said...

Does it help the intentionalist at all to say that the cloud formation that looks like the letters "T" "o" and "m" in succession does not mean Tom anymore than the color red means Tom simply because red reminds you of Tom (because he always wears a red hat)? Alternatively, if red has meaning in the same way the cloud formation does, then is the color red itself a word in the language? Or would you get around this by saying that there are non-linguistic things that have "meaning" in the relevant sense?

It seems more intuitive to me to say that the cloud, like the color red, was a stimulus that evoked in you the repsonse of thinking of the person Tom. That the cloud formation happened to be in the same physical shape as the spelling of Tom's name doesn't confer it that meaning anymore than the color red means Tom.

So the intentionalist might say that the relevant distinction in the game of being reminded of people's names is not between speaker's versus reader's meaning. Rather, the distinction is stimuli that remind you of Tom through some association (which includes things that physically resemble the spelling of his name) and stimuli that don't.

Tam Ho said...

On the other hand, suppose a human and a monkey each typed the word "fulgent" on separate pieces of paper, but in different fonts, so that an illiterate person can't even tell that these are the same words. The illiterate person finds the pieces of paper (but doesn't know who typed them), brings them to you, and asks what the words mean. It would be pretty counter-intuitive to say "well, this word means 'radiant', but that word doesn't mean anything."

Trevor Morrison said...

Hey Mike,

Very nice. Sounds like it was a fun day.

I agree with much of what you say. Thinking about the intentionalists' best possible counter, I wonder if it might be a kind of rule utilitarian answer: (1) The enterprise of finding meaning is most often done best by focusing on speaker's intended meaning (because the markings that our brains recognize as words in our language are most often put there by someone intending to convey the meaning they intend); (2) the mischief of opening up the inquiry to "shmeaning" is likely to lead us astray in more cases than it is likely to help; so (3) it makes sense to proceed on the assumption that speaker's meaning controls. This isn't, I don't think, a move over to political theory; it's still a claim about language. But instead of relying on claims about the *necessary* content of linguistic meaning (and thus interpretation), it relies on claims about the by-far-most-common content of linguistic meaning, and thus about how interpretation ought to proceed in light of that (admittedly contingent) fact. Does this place the intentionalists on any stronger ground, in your view?

Michael C. Dorf said...

Much good stuff in the comments. I agree with nearly everything that adam s says. Let me just try responding to trevor's question: The utilitarian gambit you propose would indeed give us a pretty good grounding for everyday language, but I don't see why it would lead to intentionalism in legal interpretation. Once we acknowledge that we are selecting a method of interpretation in light of expectations, consequences, etc, I see no reason why factors that generally point towards intentionalism in everyday language would override factors specific to law that point to a non-intentionalist methodology. Now, there may be reasons to stick with intentionalism even in law, but then these are certainly going to be reasons of political theory.

Unknown said...

I'm sure this is really important in some context, but all I can think of is that you guys have way too much time on your hands...

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