The Value of Getting Things Wrong: A Backhanded But Sincere Tribute to Richard Posner

Here on the blog on Monday, Professor Segall offered a moving tribute to Judge Richard Posner, who died last week. Professor Segall was personally close with Judge Posner, but I do not think that his affection biased him. Put differently, I agree with Professor Segall about the astoundingly impressive career of Judge Posner. As I have noted in several places, I regard Posner as one of the two most important U.S. judges never to sit on the U.S. Supreme Court, along with Judge Learned Hand. Given that Posner was also an incredibly prolific scholar, Posner might well be deemed to occupy the top spot.

Having said that, in today's essay, I want to make what might seem like the critical point that Judge Posner was often wrong. I do so for the purpose of situating him as fundamentally a public intellectual.

I'll begin with some illustrations. The first involves Posner's book Sex and Reason, which is probably best described as offering sociobiological explanations (the "reason" of the book's title) for the multitude of sexual practices one finds among humans. It is in the nature of sociobiology to tell just-so stories, and the book is no exception, but I don't regard that as the primary problem with the book. Just-so stories can be fascinating. More importantly, they can be understood as hypotheses that lead to research that can either confirm or reject the hypothesized phenomena. But Sex and Reason has other difficulties.

Reviewing Sex and Reason in the Georgetown Law Journal, Robin West fairly criticized Posner for seeming to justify deeply problematic misogynistic, homophobic, and otherwise harmful practices by essentially describing them as natural and thus allowing little room for condemning them. I mostly agree with West's normative position, which we might connect to a broader critique of the law & economics movement that Posner was instrumental in launching: in both settings, normative views are set out as though they are merely descriptive. Still, I regard West's overall critique (and my own) as more in the nature of disagreement with Posner than as showing he's demonstrably wrong about something.

However, Sex and Reason shows signs of having been dashed off without adequate reflection. Consider what Posner says about sexual attraction. As West accurately summarizes a claim of Sex and Reason, Posner asserts that "all men, including homosexuals, are more interested in good looks than women, which, in turn, is because all men . . . are genetically programmed to be sexually turned-on visually." Yet, as West also notes (in a footnote), elsewhere in the book, and not just in passing, "Posner insists" that, with the exception of men who have sex with men opportunistically (e.g., in prison), gay men "are genetically programmed not to reproduce." But if they're genetically programmed not to reproduce, why would they also be genetically programmed to be sexually turned-on visually--or at all, for that matter? Maybe if Posner had noticed the puzzle created by these claims he would have revised one or the other of them. Maybe he would have come up with some further hypothesis that reconciled them. He did neither because he did not seem especially interested in making all of his claims fit together. 

In other work, Posner made simple errors of fact. With apologies for its length, here's a footnote I included in my Harvard Law Review Foreword in 1998:

Judge Posner . . .  has been accused of dilettantism. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Still Worthy of Praise, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1776, 1782 (1998) (contending that Posner's Holmes Lectures inaccurately portray academic philosophy). The accusation is at least somewhat apt. For example, in the same lecture Nussbaum critiques for its philosophical errors, Judge Posner erroneously refers to bonobos as “a species of monkey.” [Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1637, 1661 (1998)]. See also Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1551, 1565 (1998) (referring to “chimpanzees and other monkeys”). Chimpanzees and bonobos (sometimes called pygmy chimpanzees) are not monkeys. They are hominoid apes. See Frans de Waal, Bonobo: The Forgotten Ape, at vi (1997). Judge Posner further asserts that feminists admire bonobos because females are dominant, adding that “[i]t would make as much sense to admire sharks, vultures, or leeches.” Posner, Problematics, at 1661; see id. at 1661 n.40 (quoting de Waal, supra). Yet behavioral patterns of bonobos and chimpanzees--species more closely related to humans than they or we are to any other extant species, see de Waal, supra, at 3--are obviously more relevant to claims about human behavior than behavioral patterns of non-mammals, see generally Roger Fouts with Stephen Tukel Mills, Next of Kin (1997) (describing the numerous ways in which chimpanzees resemble humans, including their ability to learn and use human language and transmit it to their children). De Waal strikes a careful balance in recognizing that sex roles in bonobos reflect adaptations to environmental factors different from those facing humans (and chimpanzees), see de Waal, supra, at 135, while acknowledging, as Posner does not, that “the bonobo, by virtue of its close relation to us, is a critical piece in the puzzle of human evolution,” id. at 143. Judge Posner's errors concerning the hominoid lineage could be easily overlooked, except that they occur in the middle of an argument that relies heavily on evolutionary biology as the basis for calling into question humans' ability to engage in moral reasoning. See Posner, Problematics, supra, at 1657-62; see also [Ronald Dworkin, Darwin's New Bulldog, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1718, 1723-24 (1998)] (observing that evolutionary biology appears to be at the heart of Judge Posner's normative views).

My third example comes from Posner's 2016 book Divergent Paths: The Academy and the Judiciary. I wrote what I regarded as a mixed review of the book for the Journal of Legal Education. Among other things, I noted that Posner had made at least one fairly gross error: he claimed that legal writing classes teach students to write legal jargon. In my review, I called this a calumny because that is in fact the exact opposite of what legal writing classes do. Posner would have realized as much if he had talked to anyone who teaches legal writing or to anyone who had taken a legal writing class at any point in the prior 20 years.

Posner wrote a response to my review. I replied in turn. I'll quote from the conclusion of my reply now because I want to add something to it. Here are the concluding three paragraphs:

[T]here is something nasty in some of Posner's recent writing that is uncharacteristic of his prior work and his mild manner in person. He is not exactly a bully. To his credit, he punches up at Supreme Court justices and out at prominent academics, not down. Still, Posner sometimes exhibits one of the characteristics of a bully: He can dish it out but he can't take it. As I explain in my review, his book does not merely disagree with positions taken by others; it is filled with mockery. Even in his reply, Posner includes a gratuitous insult of Justice Elena Kagan, questioning the sincerity of her personal affection for Justice Scalia. Yet Posner himself now seems thin-skinned, unable to acknowledge that his latest book might not rank among his best work and thus lashing out (at me and others) in ways that are unbecoming.

Posner wasn't always like this. In 2009, in a terrific essay in The New Republic, Posner both admitted to his prior ignorance of Keynesianism and acknowledged that his own foundational work in law and economics was incomplete. Much of Posner's charm as a judge and a public intellectual has been rooted in his ideological unpredictability--sometimes conservative, sometimes liberal, and always skeptical of pieties. In the past, that skepticism was sometimes expressed bluntly, but lately Posner has come to treat bluntness as an end in itself. It is one thing not to pull punches. It is quite another to throw them wildly, simply for the sake of provocation.

I don't know what to make of Posner's recent change. Perhaps after three and a half decades on the bench he feels more liberated than ever to speak his mind. Or perhaps the coarsening of the culture more generally has rubbed off on Posner. Whatever the cause, for those of us who have so valued Posner's work over the years, it would be a shame if his new excesses were to be seen as diminishing his extraordinary body of work as a scholar, a judge, and a public intellectual.

I now do think I know what to make of the change I noticed a decade ago: With the benefit of hindsight, I suspect that Posner was in the early stages of the dementia that would eventually afflict his final years. Early-stage dementia often manifests through personality changes. The crankiness I saw both in Divergent Paths and in Posner's response to my review may well have been symptoms of illness.

However, I do not think that the sloppiness of Divergent Paths can be attributed entirely to early dementia. Sloppiness was a characteristic of Posner's work throughout his career, including articles and books that I think are overall terrific.

It could not have been otherwise, given Posner's productivity. No human being could possibly write so much creative and thoughtful work about so many subjects as Posner did without making a fair number of mistakes. That's because it takes time to review everything one writes to ensure that everything is accurate. Even then, no one is perfect, and so a few mistakes remain. But the number of things Posner got wrong is not attributable to the inevitable occasional error. Rather, it appears to have been the product of a deliberate choice on his part to prioritize pushing out his ideas and arguments quickly, then moving on to other ideas and arguments.

Consider an interview Posner gave about his 2001 book Public Intellectuals: A Study of Decline. Asked how he compiled a list of 100 leading public intellectuals, here is the answer he gave:

what I did was compile a list, necessarily incomplete and kind of catch-as-catch-can of public intellectuals. And I got up to over 500. And at that point, I thought, well, this is -- this is not either a random or a complete -- neither a random sample nor a complete universe of public intellectuals, so I should make some cut. And what I did was simply do a -- have a computer count made of these 500-odd public intellectuals and compute who -- well, basically, who got the most mentions in the media, who received the most scholarly citations.

Now consider the opinion Judge Posner wrote in Mitchell v. JCG Industries, Inc. affirming the grant of summary judgment for the defendant employer against plaintiff employees bringing a federal Fair Labor Standards Act claim and related state law claim. Part of the dispute centered on whether the plaintiffs were entitled to overtime compensation based on the alleged fact that 10-15 minutes of their lunch break was taken up putting on and taking off specialty clothing. The summary judgment record contained conflicting evidence, so Posner had court staff (later identified as Posner himself and his law clerks) experiment donning and doffing the specialized clothing. They did it much more quickly than the plaintiffs said it took. Judge Wood dissented, in part on the ground that the experiment was not record evidence (which Posner had conceded).

Was the creation of the list for Public Intellectuals scientific? Certainly not. Was Posner's donning and doffing experiment appropriate? Almost certainly not, even though he claimed he was only doing it to test his "commonsense intuition." But in each of these endeavors and many more, we might view Posner's willingness to color outside the lines, make mistakes, and bend the rules not so much as sloppiness but as his own kind of public intellectual-ness.

Here's a potentially useful comparison. When I write for this blog, I try to get things right, but I don't run most of my blog posts by anyone before I hit "Publish." I proofread and try to correct any errors I come across, but even so, I get things wrong. When I or someone else notices an error after I've published, I correct the error (and make a note that I've done so if it's substantial). I could do a better job of catching errors before publishing by writing less, but I make a judgment that being 95% right most of the time (and very occasionally completely wrong) is worth doing rather than writing much less frequently or staying completely in my lane. In my scholarship for law reviews and books, I'm more careful, which is not to say I don't make any errors there too, but one consequence of the added care is that it takes me much longer to write academic scholarship than to write for this blog. (My Verdict columns are somewhere in between, as I have an editor there, and I tend to proofread a bit more.)

Have I struck the ideal balance between getting things right and getting things out? I don't know that there is such an ideal. Which brings us back to Posner. He was fundamentally a public intellectual in almost all of his scholarship and occasionally even in his judging. As such, he was less concerned with ensuring that every footnote was exactly right (and he hated the Blue Book) than with putting his ideas out there. He wanted to influence public discussion of important policy questions, and in that capacity he was tremendously successful.

I suppose one might think that it would have been better if Posner had written less and paid more attention to all the details or if he had written more in the style of a public intellectual. He might have written a blog or hosted a podcast, say, rather than writing books published by academic presses. Many academics, including me, make such judgments. But it is difficult to argue that in so doing we are accomplishing nearly as much as Posner did.

-- Michael C. Dorf