Dorf on Law

Last week, the Supreme Court issued its first major Fourth Amendment case in six years: Chatrie v. United States . Chatrie is a massive victory for digital privacy. It holds that geofence searches, which use cellphone data to track all cellphone users in a certain area at a certain time, are Fourth Amendment searches requiring probable cause and a warrant. It sharply limits the “third-party doctrine,” which held that data disclosed to a third party service provider lost all Fourth Amendment protection and could be obtained by the government without a warrant or cause. More than that, Chatrie definitively establishes that Fourth Amendment law in the digital era will be appropriate to that era, and not anchored to traditional property concepts or distant analogies to non-digital contexts. The future of Fourth Amendment law has never been brighter. The Chatrie case involved the investigation of a bank robbery. On May 20, 2019, a man wearing a fisherman’s hat and a traffic vest robbed a...

With the most recent Supreme Court term now behind us, we here at Dorf on Law will soon be moving on from the case-specific analyses penned by our constitutional law scholars -- including, just this past week, the rulings on independent federal agencies  (plus a guest scholar's analysis of the same case),  anti-transgender laws, and  birthright citizenship -- to writing summary analyses of the term, a term that was defined by the six Republican-appointed justices' increasingly blatant (and depressingly predictable) choice to be part of the Trumpian assault on democracy and the rule of law. I will write one such summary soon, but because today is the last weekday before the Fourth of July holiday, I am offering here some thoughts about the distressing spectacle that is my country at age 250.  In 2005, a bit more than a year before Dorf on Law was founded, I published a short guest piece about the Declaration of Independence on someone else's blog.  (Tha...

If you had asked me a year and a half ago what the prospects were for President Trump's executive order limiting birthright citizenship if and when the issue made it to the Supreme Court, I would have said the Court would reject the order either 9-0 or 8-1, with 7-2 being my upper limit on dissents. The two dissenters I would have predicted, obviously, would have been Justices Thomas and Alito. Professor Buchanan, who is, depending on one's view, either more cynical or less naive than I am about the Supreme Court, thought that the Court would likely uphold the order--even though, as he made very very clear in his February 2025 blog post , he believed the argument for doing so extraordinarily weak. But he noted how, with support from motivated legal scholars, off-the-wall ideas can become on the wall (in Professor Jack Balkin's memorable phrasing). I never quite got all the way to Professor Buchanan's view, but my prediction grew closer to his a year ago, after the Supre...

Justice Kavanaugh's opinion for the Court in  West Virginia v. B.P.J.   is a culture warriors' mixed bag. In addition to making clear how important he thinks girls' and women's participation in competitive sports is, he includes some trans-inclusive language at the end of his opinion. At the same time, however, he repeatedly uses the term "biological male" when referring to transgender girls and women, and not just when it's relevant to parsing the challenged policies. In so doing, the lead opinion sides with the ongoing national anti-trans panic. That said, I prefer the tone of Kavanaugh's majority to the gratuitously and vehemently anti-trans concurrence of Justice Thomas. I suppose the best thing that can be said about that concurrence is that Justice Alito didn't join it. What about the substance? Let's start with the Title IX claim, which was at issue in  B.P.J.  but not the companion case of  Little v. Hecox  (which, as the dissent conten...

The Supreme Court's long expected decision in  Trump v. Slaughter  is ostrich-like in the majority Justices' notable refusal to examine how its decision might empower a president with distinctly autocratic tendencies . (The ostrich comparison is not originally mine; Justice Jackson called the majority in  Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard   "ostrich-like" in its "hope that preventing consideration of race will end racism.")  As most commentators expected, the Court in  Slaughter overruled Humphrey's Executor v. United States   and held unconstitutional for-cause removal protection for FTC Commissioners (and, by extension, most other independent agencies' leadership). Chief Justice Roberts' opinion relies heavily on founding-era materials to conclude that the framers created a "unitary and accountable executive." I happen to believe that the Court places too much weight on founding-era history and also that its reading of that his...

Given the Court's failure to grant interim relief and its per curiam opinion last year in Trump v. Wilcox , the ruling today in Trump v. Slaughter cannot have come as a surprise to anyone paying even the slightest bit of attention. That is not to say that Slaughter will be anything but a disaster. By invalidating removal restrictions for the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and nearly every other hitherto independent agency,  the Court has backed the ongoing onslaught of political cronyism as against professional government. The decision would be harmful under any circumstances. It is all the more so now, when the particular president empowered to remove members of independent agencies without cause is a corrupt, vindictive narcissist whose preferred replacements for subject-area experts are sycophantic ignoramuses. Having said that, I will give the conservative super-majority who signed onto the Chief Justice's opinion in Slaughter a little bit of credit. They had the decency ...

Good morning! This morning the Supreme Court will hand down opinions in some or all of the merits cases remaining on this docket from the OT 2025 Term. We await rulings in: Trump v. Barbara (birthright citizenship). I blogged about the case here and here . Prof Krishnamurthi blogged about it here . I also hosted a guest post on the case from Profs Scott Titshaw and Stephen Yale-Loehr. And I wrote a Verdict column about the policy stakes. Trump v. Slaughter (independent agencies). I blogged about this case before and again after the oral argument. Trump v. Cook (pretextual firing of Fed Governor Lisa Cook). I addressed some of the issues at stake back in August of last year. I took a deep dive into whether the Fed is really distinguishable from other independent agencies just before the oral argument. Little v. Hecox and W. Va. v. B.P.J. (transgender athletes). I filed a brief  (as co-counsel and as an amicus party) in support of the trans athletes in these cases. I prev...

Reasonable people can disagree over whether the Constitution as a whole protects an individual right to own guns apart from militia service. Although the Supreme Court has misread text and distorted history to locate that right in the Second Amendment, which only applies to militia service, such a right could be created by reasonable judicial interpretations of the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments. After all, the Court has recognized an array of fundamental unenumerated rights, such as the right of competent adults to refuse medical treatment, and Americans have prized their guns for centuries in ways that might suggest judicial protection for such a right. Reasonable people can also disagree in many cases involving gun laws over whether the right is burdened in ways that are not justified by the reasons supporting the law. The virtually complete ban on handguns in District of Columbia v. Heller , for example, might be such a law. But the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State ...