by Michael C. Dorf
On Monday, the SCOTUS issued a 2-page
per curiam order dismissing as moot a 2nd Amendment challenge to a NYC ordinance that had forbade the transport of licensed firearms from an owner's home to a shooting range outside the city. As the terse order in
New York State Rifle & Pistol Assoc. Inc. v. City of New York explained, the city amended the ordinance and New York State amended its statutes in a way that provided the plaintiffs all they sought in their lawsuit. Thus, the request for declaratory and injunctive relief is moot. Citing prior practice, the
per curiam left open the possibility that, on remand to the lower courts, the plaintiffs might be able to argue that the revised ordinance is also unconstitutional insofar as it forbids licensed gun owners from stopping for gas, food, coffee, or to use the restroom en route from home to a shooting range outside the city. The defendants deny that the new rule would apply so woodenly, but the SCOTUS order leaves the matter for development in the lower courts. The order also leaves to the lower courts the determination whether it is too late for the plaintiffs to amend their complaint to include a claim for damages; such a claim would not be mooted by the prospective repeal of the rule, insofar as its past application imposed compensable harm.
In a dissent joined by Justices Thomas and Gorsuch, Justice Alito argued that the case was not moot. He first contended that the new rule and law do not give the plaintiffs everything they sought, endorsing the plaintiffs' gas/food/coffee/restroom theory without even acknowledging, much less refuting, the majority's citation of
the precedent for leaving such a question for remand. Justice Alito also gave a second rationale for his assertion that the case was not moot: the plaintiffs already asked for damages, he said. How so? Justice Alito wrote that "while the amended complaint does not expressly seek damages, it is enough that it requests '[a]ny other such further relief as the [c]ourt deems just and proper.' " The dissent goes on to contend that such a generic statement--which one finds in every civil complaint filed by a competent lawyer--suffices to avoid mootness, given the possibility of nominal damages (and a speculative claim of actual damages), notwithstanding the Court's admonition in
a 1997 case that "a claim for nominal damages, extracted late in the day from [a] general prayer for relief and asserted solely to avoid otherwise certain mootness, [bears] close inspection."
Who's right about the relevance to mootness of a civil complaint's generic any-further-relief clause? If I were deciding the question on my own and writing on a clean slate, I would say the SCOTUS should rarely if ever dismiss a case as moot, because I generally dislike the application of strict rules of standing, ripeness, and mootness in the Supreme Court--which, as a practical matter, functions much like a European-style constitutional court and therefore ought, in my view, to suspend the fiction that it sits simply to resolve particular concrete cases and controversies. However, the Court isn't writing on a clean slate, and the majority appears to have applied the relevant mootness precedents more faithfully than Justice Alito's dissent.
Moreover, it is hard to take seriously the dissenters' solicitude for plaintiffs who include generic any-further-relief language in their complaints, given recent history, by which I mean the
per curiam opinion that all of the
NYS Rifle & Pistol dissenters joined in the
Wisconsin election case just 3 weeks earlier. Thus, after reading the
NYS Rifle & Pistol dissent, on Monday
I tweeted: "Alito, Thomas & Gorsuch dissent from today's 2d Am mootness ruling because the complaint had 'any further relief' request but 3 weeks ago voted to kill WI voters for failure to ask specifically for relief from nonexistent law, despite same language in complaint. Seems backwards."
But wait. If Justices Alito, Thomas, and Gorsuch are hypocrites for thinking that a complaint's generic any-further-relief clause avoids mootness for gun rights plaintiffs but doesn't permit relief for voting-rights plaintiffs, does that imply that Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan--who voted with majority in NYS Rifle & Pistol but dissented in the Wisconsin election case--are also hypocrites? The answer is no, for three principal reasons.